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Scissors and Rock Game Theory for Those Who Manage

:	Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
:	Scissors and Rock Game Theory for Those Who Manage
:	Springer-Verlag
:	9783030448233
:	1
:	CHF 38.00
:

:	Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, Stochastik, Mathematische Statistik
:	English

:	268
:	Wasserzeichen/DRM
:	PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
:	PDF

This book introduces readers to basic game theory as a tool to deal with strategic decision problems, helping them to understand the complexity of such problems - to extract a solution, if possible - and to manage the complexity by revising the game if appropriate. The authors discuss basic decision situations modeled as Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Stag Hunt Game, as well as concepts like the Nash equilibrium, Trembling Hand Perfectness, Rationalizable Strategies and the Theory of Moves to introduce game theoretic thinking. Further, the book presents pioneers of strategic thinking, e.g., Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Adam Smith, and Goethe, and includes cases of conflict and cooperation to illustrate practical applications. Readers learn to apply game theory in business and in daily life - to manage their decision problems and to better understand the decision problems of others.

Manfred J. Holler is an Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg (Germany). He is the founding editor of, and managed the respectedEuropean Journal of Political Economy (1985-1993), andHomo Oeconomicus (1983-20 5). He currently serves as an assessing editor or board member for several journals, such as The Journal of Mind and Behavior,Control and Cybernetics, theE ropean Journal of Law and Economics, and Games. H is one of the Editors-in-Chief of Homo Oeconomicus.

B rbara Klose-Ullmann holds a PhD. in Economics and worked for more than 25 years as a manager at a major German bank, where she participated in the bargaining for licenses in Eastern Europe. She has published a series of articles applying game theory to the analysis of strategic interaction in history, myths, and theatre plays, and authored books on health, in economic history of economics, and on game theory (co-authored with Manfred J. Holler).

	Preface: Introduction and Warnings	5
	Contents	10
	1 Playing for Susan	14
	1.1Thinking Strategically	15
	1.2Why not Learn Game Theory?	17
	1.3The Working of the Invisible Hand	19
	1.4The Real World and Its Models	23
	1.5Winner-Takes-It-All and the Chicken Game	25
	1.6The Essence of Game Theory, the Brain, and Empathy	28
	1.7Strategic Thinking that Failed—Perhaps	31
	References	33
	2 No Mathematics	35
	2.1Historical Note I: The Pioneers	35
	2.2The Concept of Sets	39
	2.3Prices and Quantities	42
	2.4From Set to Mapping and Function	43
	2.5Utilities, Payoff Functions, and Strategy Vectors	45
	2.6Monkeys Write Shakespeare, but Where Is Hamlet?	47
	References	50
	3 The Prisoners’ Dilemma, but Who Are the Players?	51
	3.1From Game Form to Payoff Matrix	51
	3.2Equilibrium in Dominant Strategies	56
	3.3Catch-22 and Other Social Traps	57
	3.4Ways Out of the Dilemma	59
	3.5Who Are the Players?	61
	3.6Then Strike	64
	3.7Tosca’s Dominant Strategy	67
	References	69
	4 The Nash Equilibrium	70
	4.1On the Definition of the Nash Equilibrium	70
	4.2Historical Note II: Nash and the Nash Equilibrium	73
	4.3Nash Equilibria and Chicken Game	74
	4.4Inefficient Equilibria in the QWERTY-DSK Game	78
	4.5Who Are the Players in the QWERTY-DSK Game?	81
	4.6Nash Equilibria in Kamasutra Games	83
	References	84
	5 Sequence of Moves and the Extensive Form	86
	5.1The Shrinking of the Event Matrix	86
	5.2Sequential Structure and Chicken Game	87
	5.3Extensive Form and Game Tree	89
	5.4Information: Perfect, Imperfect, Complete, and Incomplete	90
	5.5Perfect Recall Missing	93
	5.6The Battle of the Sexes	97
	5.7What Is a Strategy?	100
	5.8Sharing a Cake	102
	5.9Theory of Moves	103
	References	106
	6 Chaos, Too Many and Too Few	107
	6.1The El Farol Problem or “Too Many People at the Same Spot”	108
	6.2Self-referential Systems	110
	6.3Solutions to the El Farol Problem	111
	6.4Market Congestion Game	113
	6.5Viruses for Macintosh	114
	6.6The Volunteer’s Dilemma	116
	References	122
	7 Which Strategy to Choose?	123
	7.1Nash Equilibrium and Optimal Strategy	124
	7.2Equilibrium Choice and Trembling Hand	126
	7.3Trembling Hand Perfection and Market Congestion	128
	7.4Rationalizable Strategies	131
	References	133
	8 Step-by-Step: The Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium	134
	8.1Market Entry Game with Monopoly	135
	8.2Backward Induction and Optimal Strategies	136
	8.3The Ultimatum Game	139
	8.4Social Trust and the Stag Hunt Game	142
	8.5How Reciprocity Works	145
	References	148
	9 Forever and a Day	150
	9.1The Competition Trap Closes	152
	9.2Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma and the “Ravages of Time”	154
	9.3The Competition Trap Breaking Down	157
	9.4Robert Axelrod’s “Tournament of Strategies”	161
	9.5“The True Egoist Cooperates.”—Yes, but Why?	164
	9.6The Folk Theorem and “What We Have Always Known”	167
	References	172
	10 Mixed Strategies and Expected Utility	174
	10.1From Lottery to Expected Utility	175
	10.2The Allais Paradox and Kahneman-Tversky	178
	10.3Optimal Inspection in Mixed Strategies	181
	10.4Maximin Solution and the Inspection Game	185
	10.5Chicken Game Equilibria and Maximin Solution	188
	10.6Miller’s Crucible and the Stag Hunt Game	189
	10.7Zero-Sum Games and Minimax Theorem	192
	10.8The Goalie’s Anxiety at the Penalty Kick	197
	10.9Scissors and Rock	200
	References	202
	11 More Than Two Players	204
	11.1The Value of Coalitions	205
	11.2The Core	206
	11.3Network Games	208
	11.4Epilogue to the Core and Other Bargaining Solutions	213
	11.5Competition and Cooperation in the Triad	216
	References	220
	12 Bargaining and Bargaining Games	221
	12.1The Bargaining Problem and the Solution	222
	12.2Rubinstein Game and the Shrinking Pie	227
	12.3Binding Agreements and the Nash Solution	233
	12.4Properties, Extensions, and the Nash Program	239
	References	244
	13 Goethe’s Price Games, Auctions, and Other Surprises	245
	13.1The Story of a Second-Price Auction	246
	13.2The Price-Setting Goethe	250
	13.3Optimal Strategies in Auctions and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem	253
	13.4All-Pay Auction, Attrition, and Pyrrhic Victory	258
	13.5Who Likes to Pay High Prices?	260
	References	262
	Index	263