| Dedication | 5 |
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| Acknowledgements | 6 |
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| Contents | 8 |
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| Chapter 1: Next: The Fifth Stabilization Experiment Under Fiat Money | 10 |
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| First Stage of Fiat System Disorder: 1914–31 | 10 |
| Second Stage, 1931–68 | 12 |
| Third Stage: 1969–85 | 13 |
| Fourth Stage: Mid-1980s to Present Day (2018–?) | 14 |
| How Would an Asset Price Deflation Crisis Emerge? | 17 |
| How Could a Goods and Services Inflation Shock Erupt? | 18 |
| The Looming Fifth Stage of Monetary Disorder | 18 |
| Bibliography | 19 |
| Chapter 2: Origins of the Global 2% Inflation Standard | 20 |
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| Inflation Shock of the Late 1980s | 20 |
| New Zealand Leads the Way | 22 |
| Stanley Fischer and the Neo-Keynesian Reach for Power | 23 |
| The Glacial “Ascent” of the US to Joining the 2% Inflation Standard | 26 |
| Greenspan and Bernanke Complete the Journey to 2% Inflation Standard | 28 |
| Summary: The Present Case Against 2% Inflation | 29 |
| A Look-Back to Contemporary Arguments Against 2% | 32 |
| Bibliography | 34 |
| Chapter 3: Diagnosis of Monetary Inflation in Asset Markets | 35 |
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| Asset Price Inflation Defined | 36 |
| Stages of Asset Price Inflation | 37 |
| The Twins of Asset Price Inflation and Goods Inflation | 39 |
| Characteristics of Boom-Type Asset Price Inflation | 40 |
| Characteristics of Depression-Type Asset Price Inflations | 42 |
| Carry Trades Under Depression-Type Asset Price Inflation | 47 |
| 2018: Depression-Type Asset Price Inflation Update | 49 |
| Bibliography | 50 |
| Chapter 4: Manipulation of Long-Term Interest Rates | 51 |
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| The Journey to Long-Term Rate Dysfunction | 51 |
| Bernanke Dislocates the Monetary Base | 54 |
| The Cost of Long-Term Rate Market Dysfunction | 57 |
| The Re-entry Problem: How Bond Markets Return to Normal Signalling | 58 |
| Monetary Policy Anaesthesia Under 2% Inflation | 60 |
| Bibliography | 62 |
| Chapter 5: A Failure of US Checks and Balances | 63 |
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| The Acquiescence of Congress in the 2% Inflation Target | 64 |
| 1920s Precedent for Congress Ignoring Fed Policy as Cause of Crisis | 65 |
| Congress Adopts a Price Stabilization Mandate First in Mid-1970s | 67 |
| No Murmur from Congress When Fed Abandons Money Supply Targets | 70 |
| Republicans Fail in Their Opposition to “Obama Fed” | 72 |
| Audit the Fed | 73 |
| A Coalition for Sound Money Reform | 76 |
| Bibliography | 80 |
| Chapter 6: Digitalization, Camouflage, and Monetary Inflation | 82 |
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| Camouflaged Inflation | 82 |
| Digitalization Revolution Enables the Monetary Inflationist | 85 |
| Speculative Narratives Justify Bad Bets | 87 |
| The Digitalization Revolution and the Neutral Rate of Interest | 93 |
| The Camouflaged Monetary Inflation Boost of 2016–17 | 97 |
| Bibliography | 100 |
| Chapter 7: Much Ruin in Japan’s Journey to 2% | 101 |
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| The Miracle Years End in Great Inflation | 102 |
| Japan on the Edge of Monetarist Experiments 1977–84/85 | 103 |
| Japan’s Camouflaged Monetary Inflation in Response to Plaza 1985–89 | 104 |
| The Depression and Rapid Recovery Which Did Not Occur 1990–97 | 106 |
| Radical Monetary Experimentation Fuels a Giant Yen Carry Trade 1998–2007 | 107 |
| The Shirakawa Resistance to US-Led Monetary Inflation 2008–12 | 110 |
| Shinzo Abe Puts Japan on the 2% Inflation Standard | 113 |
| No One Believes the Bank of Japan’s 2% Inflation Megillah | 115 |
| Japan Heads Towards End Phase of Asset Price Inflation | 117 |
| Bibliography | 120 |
| Chapter 8: Germany Abdicates Hard Money Power | 121 |
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| Founders of EMU Had No Sound Money Vision | 121 |
| The Details of German Abdication | 125 |
| Bundesbank Fails Hard Money Advocates Throughout EMU Journey | 127 |
| Under Chancellor Merkel, Maastricht Monetary Constitution Becomes Dead Letter | 128 |
| The ECB Embraces the 2% Inflation Standard | 130 |
| Draghi-Merkel Pact on Vast Monetary Base Expansion | 132 |
| Could Germany Yet Lead the World Back to Hard Money? | 134 |
| Bibliography | 136 |
| Chapter 9: Unaffordable Housing and Poor-Quality Money | 137 |
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| A Plague of High House Prices | 138 |
| Sound Money Fosters Affordable Housing | 139 |
| Emotions Stoke Asset Inflation in Housing | 140 |
| Dysfunctional Long-Term Rate Markets Fuel Housing Distortions | 141 |
| Subsidy on Leverage Hits Affordability | 142 |
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