| Foreword | 7 |
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| Contents | 10 |
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| List of Figures | 12 |
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| List of Tables | 17 |
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| Introduction | 28 |
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| 1 Globalisation Sets the Background to the Crisis | 37 |
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| Introduction to Globalisation | 37 |
| The OECD Countries Open Up | 38 |
| The Case of Japan | 40 |
| Mexico Crises | 43 |
| Washington Consensus | 44 |
| Emerging Asia | 45 |
| The China Growth Phase | 47 |
| In Summary | 49 |
| The China Path to Prosperity and the US Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 | 50 |
| Export Success and Import Penetration Strategies | 51 |
| Exchange Rate Management and Pricing for Market Share | 53 |
| The Saving Glut and Real Interest Rates | 56 |
| Capital Inflows, Foreign Exchange Intervention and Bond Buying | 59 |
| The Impact of the Rise of Asia on the West | 61 |
| The Competitive Response of Western Companies to Competition from Asia | 61 |
| The Impact of Import Penetration and Firm Innovation on Western Labour Markets | 64 |
| Deflation Pressures in Firms Most Affected by Globalisation | 67 |
| Summing up the Globalisation Background to the Crisis in the USA | 69 |
| The Great Bond Rally | 69 |
| The Great House Price Rally | 71 |
| Appendix to Chapter 1: Modelling the Effect of Foreign Buying on US Bond Yields | 72 |
| References | 73 |
| 2 Financial Innovation and Basel II | 76 |
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| Introduction to Financial Deregulation and Innovation | 76 |
| The Basel Accords I and II | 79 |
| Financial Innovations: Securitisation and Derivatives | 84 |
| Support for Housing in the USA | 84 |
| Packaging Mortgages | 86 |
| Trading Mortgages Take off | 88 |
| Securitisation Follows | 89 |
| The ‘Waterfall’ | 89 |
| The Mortgage Conduit (REMIC) and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) | 91 |
| Teaser Rates and On-Selling | 94 |
| Derivatives | 94 |
| Derivatives Have a Long History | 94 |
| But the Huge Expansion of Derivative Activity Is Recent | 97 |
| Regulating OTC Derivatives in the Run-up to the Crisis | 98 |
| The Demand for Securitisation and Derivatives | 100 |
| Basic Bank Balance Sheet Arithmetic | 100 |
| The Boom in Derivatives | 102 |
| Regulatory and Tax Arbitrage with Complete Markets in Credit | 107 |
| A Basic Regulatory Principle | 109 |
| Banks, Implicit Government Guarantees and Shadow Banks | 110 |
| Tax Arbitrage | 111 |
| Targeting the Ratio of Risk Weighted to Total Assets to Maximise the Return on Equity | 112 |
| Summary | 114 |
| Appendix to Chapter 2: Problems with Pillar 1 | 115 |
| References | 118 |
| 3 The Watershed Year of 2004: Origins and Causes of the Crisis | 121 |
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| Introduction | 121 |
| Global Competition and the Equity Culture for Banking | 122 |
| Remuneration | 124 |
| Causality | 125 |
| Institutional and Regulatory Issues | 125 |
| Why Subprime Securitisation Was Concentrated in the USA | 125 |
| Why US Subprime Securitisation Accelerated from 2004 | 127 |
| The American Dream Act | 128 |
| The Fannie and Freddie Caps | 129 |
| The Announcement of Basel II | 130 |
| The SEC Rule Changes in 2004 | 132 |
| Corporate Governance | 134 |
| The Crisis Hits, the Lehman Moment | 143 |
| Appendix to Chapter 3: Modelling the Acceleration of US RMBS from 2004 | 144 |
| References | 146 |
| 4 Business Models of Banks and Global Contagion | 148 |
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| Introduction | 148 |
| Contrasting Banking Conglomerate Asset and Liability Composition | 149 |
| Synthetic CDO Issuance by Banks | 151 |
| Issuance of Credit Derivative Structured Products | 154 |
| Bank Losses at the Time of the Crisis | 156 |
| The AIG Payouts | 156 |
| Too Big to Fail, Contagion and Counterparty Risk | 157 |
| Commercial Versus Investment Banking | 160 |
| External Cost of Crises and Resolution Credibility | 161 |
| Appendix A to Chapter 4: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Crisis | 164 |
| Appendix B to Chapter 4: Accounting Standard Controversy Around the Crisis and IFRS9 | 167 |
| References | 169 |
| 5 Managing the Crisis, Exit and Requirements of Reform | 170 |
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| Introduction | 170 |
| Crisis Management | 172 |
| Provision of Liquidity | 172 |
| Deposit Guarantees (and the Covered Bond Fallacy) | 175 |
| Separation of Bad Assets | 176 |
| Recapitalisation of the Banks | 179 |
| Exit from Emergency Measures | 180 |
| Unconventional Monetary Policy and Interest Rates | 181 |
| Requirements for Long-term Reform | 182 |
| The Bank Separation Issue | 186 |
| The Non-operating Holding Company Structure | 187 |
| Conclusions | 188 |
| References | 189 |
| 6 The Determinants of the Riskiness of Banks | 190 |
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| Introduction | 190 |
| The Different Aspects of Bank Risk | 193 |
| Determinants of Bank Default Risk | 199 |
| Conclusions | 202 |
| Appendix to Chapter 6: Modelling the Distance-to-Default | 203 |
| Model of GSIB Banks’ DTD | 204 |
| References | 206 |
| 7 Why Bank Separation Must Complement the Leverage Ratio | 207 |
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| Introduction | 207 |
| Business Model Risk for GSIBs Cannot Be Dealt with by Capital Rules | 208 |
| The Structural Separation Proposal | 210 |
| Illustrating the Separate Effects of Leverage Ratios and Investment Bank Separation | 213 |
| Comparisons with Other Separation Proposals | 216 |
| The Attempt to Separate Speculative Functions (Volcker | 216 |
| 216 | 216 |
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| Thoughts on the Mnuchin Review | 221 |
| European Liikanen Proposal | 222 |
| The UK Vickers Rule |