: Jesper Lyng Jensen, Susanne Sublett
: Redefining Risk& Return The Economic Red Phone Explained
: Palgrave Macmillan
: 9783319413693
: 1
: CHF 56.90
:
: Management
: English
: 165
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF

This book is the first attempt to re-define objective risk. It addresses the cost of running out of capital as a generalized cost syndrome and explains how it is possible to describe this cost in such a way as to give it practical, real-life significance for personal finances, company finances and the economy as a whole. The discussion begins by presenting an intuitive and useful definition of risk: the probability of prospective capital shortfall. From this point it establishes a risk theory and expands the work of major thinkers such as Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes, and adds reserve capital as a new financial risk management tool, with an economic function that is different from savings. This book will be of interest to economists, politicians, and decision makers as well as to the general public.




Jesper Lyng Jensen is a risk professional with a broad range of experience in high risk industries such as Pharmaceutical R&D, Construction Mega Projects, and Oil& Gas Exploration and Production. Jesper also spent 6 years as consultant and independent risk researcher, which is also his current occupation.

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Susanne Sublett graduated from Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Denmark, with a master's degree in Economics. Having spent many years working in France in the wine industry, rising to the position of CFO, she returned to Denmark to begin a career in the credit risk industry. Today, Susanne works as a lead financial advisor in the global finance department of a major international IT company.
Preface6
Contents8
List of Figures10
List of Tables15
List of Formula16
1: Introduction17
What Is the Financing Cost of Suddenly Running Out of Capital?22
2: How to Read a Monte Carlo Simulation Graph24
3: Introduction to the Cost of Running Out of Capital30
A Risk Owner and a Structure31
4: Risk and Uncertainty34
The Concept of Risk34
The Description of Risk and Uncertainty35
Correlated Risks38
How Do We Process Risk?39
People, Risk, and Uncertainty40
5: The Cost of Running Out of Capital44
Experiments and the Limitations of Literature44
The Red Phone48
Structural Risk Cost51
Structural Risk52
The Loss if a Red Phone Call Is Not Answered52
Cost Syndrome55
Overview of Structural Risk57
Who Are Risk Owners?58
The Risk Owner’s Perspective on Risk59
Hidden Cost That Hampers Growth in Society64
6: Capital67
Relations Between Risk and Return71
Bowman’s Paradox74
Financial Stress Testing75
Ineffective Return on Reserves81
Final Points Concerning Capital83
7: Insurance84
The Historical Importance of Insurance84
Insurance as Protection Against Red Phone Situations85
Defective Insurance90
The Anti-Social Risk Cost That Can Be Removed as It Occurs94
Health Insurance96
Tax-Paid Insurance100
Moral Hazard101
Final Observations Regarding Insurance107
8: The Different Costs of Risk108
9: Stock Taking111
10: Macroeconomics118
Equilibrium118
The Formula for Society’s Structural Risk Cost120
Factors in the Formula for Society’s Structural Risk Cost122
Natural Disasters123
Illness123
Crime124
The Police and the Judicial System124
Corruption125
Dental Care125
Accidents and Injuries126
Crises and Macroeconomics126
Conditions on the Labour Market127
The Financial Factors Included in the Formula of Society’s Structural Risk Cost128
Perspectives on the Use of the Formula for Society’s Structural Risk Cost129
Keynes’ Savings Paradox129
Tax Relief130
Equality131
Displacement of Equilibrium135
11: Self-Chosen Risk and Government Intervention137
The Future and Structural Risk Cost141
12: The Top Ten Most Important Realisations Regarding Structural Risk145
The Cost of Risk Is Different, Depending on Who Owns It145
Reserve Capital Generates a Higher Return than Savings146
Bowman’s Paradox Is Not a Paradox146
Insurance Can Improve the Return on an Investment147
The Structural Risk Cost Is Destructive and Harmful to Society147
The Structural Risk Cost Can Be Removed After the Risk Event Has Occurred148
Keynes’ Savings Paradox Is Not a Paradox148
A Purely Market-Driven Insurance System Is Not Necessarily Ideal149
The State Can Increase Societal Growth by Removing Risks for Risk Owners149
Long-Term Growth Is Not Just a Matter of Stimulating Consumption150
13: The Cost of Structural Risk Management in Liberalism151
14: How Is This Book to Be Understood and What Kind of Society Does It Wish to Create?157
Bibliography161
Index164