The Decision to employ Nuclear Weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
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Joe Majerus
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The Decision to employ Nuclear Weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
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Anchor Academic Publishing
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9783954895601
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1
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CHF 22.30
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:
20. Jahrhundert (bis 1945)
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English
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66
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kein Kopierschutz/DRM
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PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
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PDF
Throughout human history there may hardly be found any other single decision that still causes such high amounts of scholarly debate as does the dropping of Atomic Bombs upon the Japanese city of Hiroshima in August 6th 1945, and respectively, three days later upon the city of Nagasaki. These events have caused close to 100 000 casualties in the civilian population, and yet, it does not include all of those persons who would later succumb to radiation sickness or severe birth deformations. Historians still debate the alleged plurality of motives underlying this momentous decision. The debate's result is a polarized scholarly discord which by now virtually abounds in a multitude of different theories, and competing suppositions. On the one hand, there are those scholars who argue that the decision rested solely on grounds of military expediency, foremost on the necessity to shorten a gruelling war, and to save the lives of American soldiers. On the other hand, historians offer the explanation that American policy makers above all wanted to exhibit their country's enormous military potency, and therefore, Hiroshima and Nagasaki should demonstrate the vast destructive potential which presently solely the United States had at its command, and so, counter post-war ambitions of the Soviet Union. The author of this study analyses the contextual circumstances in the spring and summer of 1945, and moreover, the principal motives of the key American government officials. Accordingly, the author offers his own substantive and conclusive answer to the question that concerns the primary factors and/or ostensibly ulterior motives that led American decision makers to issue the consequential order to detonate Atomic Bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First and foremost, the findings rest upon a critical and comprehensive engagement, and are based on the available documentary evidence from this time.
Text sample: Chapter 4.2, The Potsdam Conference: Final Chance to avoid Nuclear Holocaust: It was the Potsdam conference - held from July 17th to July 29th 1945 - which then basically set the scene for providing the Japanese government with a final chance to avoid further devastation, exhorting them in that meeting's declaration that unless they accede to the demand of an'unconditional surrender of all armed forces', they would essentially face nothing short of'prompt and utter destruction.' Moreover, the Potsdam conference ultimately also is of seminal significance for the historical analysis of why nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on two further important counts: For one it was during that meeting that, on July 17th 1945, American scientists in the New Mexican desert bore witness to the true genesis of the Nuclear Age following the first successful detonation of an atomic test device, with the result that the United States thus at last gained definitive certitude of the fact that it would before long find itself in the position to release these recently liberated forces of nature upon its enemy, even though in its applicable form the bomb was still only expected to become available in early August. In addition, the Potsdam declaration has ever since also been the subject of much controversy on account of the content and formulation of some of its key provisions, notably the failure to include an explicit assurance with regard to the preservation of Japan's imperial institution. However, that aspect had in fact actually been a central point of dispute in the weeks leading up to the conference, with members of a special committee entrusted with the framing of the final draft of the proclamation voicing profound misgivings over precisely this very issue. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, for instance, argued that without any concrete guarantee about the retention of the Emperor there would ultimately be little chance for the proclamation to be accepted by the Japanese. Still, most senior officials of the Truman Administration ultimately did not see much cause to heed admonitions such as these, with both former Secretary of State Cordell Hull as well as his successor James F. Byrnes vehemently opposing the inclusion of any language alluding towards the potential preservation of Japan's imperial dynasty. Despite last-minute efforts by Henry L. Stimson to the effect of perhaps adding after all at least some basic provision about Japan's imperial tradition, President Truman, for his part, in the end basically seemed to agree with the present version of the proclamation he and the other Allied leaders were to sign shortly. For although Stimson had informed the President that a formal assurance to preserve the Emperor might actually go a long way towards making the Japanese more susceptible to an early surrender, Truman evidently thought otherwise, ultimately contenting his Secretary of War with the promise that he would personally see to it that the Japanese be given such a guarantee at a later date through diplomatic channels if indeed they should continue to insist on that particular point. In view of these comments, one might rightfully raise the question as to why exactly Truman ultimately didn't press for the interpolation of an official assurance to the Japanese about the inviolability of their imperial institution. Certainly it would be too easy to simply attribute the omission of such a provision to circumstances of'bureaucratic inertia', meaning that since the original formulation of the text that was to be transmitted to the Japanese had already been sent to the Chinese delegation for confirmation, there now basically no longer existed an opportunity to amend its final wording. According to Stimson, Truman was in fact still waiting for clearance by Chinese Premier Chiang Kai-shek and had, moreover, told him that he would actually only thereafter'release the warning' to the Japanese. By implication, this meant that as of yet there still had not been issued any public statement whatsoever with regard to the final surrender demands, so that Truman - in his capacity as President of the United States - ultimately could surely still have ordered for a revision of certain aspects of the definite formulation, provided of course that he would have wished to do so. Nevertheless, does the allegedly deliberate neglect to stipulate an explicit assurance about Japan's imperial tradition necessarily offer a legitimate base for accusations that President Truman ultimately'needed Japan's refusal to justify the use of the atomic bomb' in the first place? While it is true that Truman was indeed fairly convinced of the fact that the Japanese would in all likelihood not accept the Potsdam Declaration in the form it was presently being handed over to them, it would on principle still seem logical to assume that ultimately he just didn't see any compelling reason for seriously considering the insertion of
The Decision to employ Nuclear Weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
1
Table of Contents
3
1 Introduction
5
2 The War against Japan
7
2.1 Imperial Resistance
7
2.2 Tactics of Strategic Bombing
10
2.3 Operation Downfall
12
3 Alternatives for ending the War
15
3.1 The impracticalities of a diplomatic solution
15
3.2 Conventional alternatives: Military and Economic
21
3.3 Soviet assistance
24
4 Paths to Nuclear Destruction
26
4.1 “Shock and Awe”
26
4.2 The Potsdam Conference: Final Chance to avoid Nuclear Holocaust
30
4.3 The Empire's Last Stand
33
4.4 The selection of targets
34
5 The Detonation of Atomic Bombs
37
6 Reasons for employing Nuclear Weapons
41
6.1 Diplomatic Power Game
42
6.2 Structural Imperatives
47
7 Conclusion
53
8 Bibliography
60
8.1 Primary Sources
60
8.2 Secondary Sources
63
8.3 Internet Sites
64
