Environmental Law Regulations of Pesticide Usage: Challenges of Enforcement and Compliance in the Shinyanga Region, Tanzania
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Peter Matata
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Environmental Law Regulations of Pesticide Usage: Challenges of Enforcement and Compliance in the Shinyanga Region, Tanzania
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Anchor Academic Publishing
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9783954895168
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1
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CHF 26.80
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Stadt-, Raum- und Landschaftsplanung
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English
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70
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kein Kopierschutz/DRM
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PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
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PDF
The lack of compliance and enforcement of agricultural chemical use legislation in Tanzania has raised concerns due to the significant environmental and public health threats that result from the unregulated discharge of industrial effluents. The utilization of the 'Table of Eleven' tool, a behaviour-analysis model providing insight into the level of legislative compliance, makes it possible to explore motives that encourage farmers to comply with, or violate, the existing agricultural chemical use legislation. This paper discusses how the application of the 'Table of Eleven' tool has enabled the government of Tanzania to reveal strong and weak points pertaining to the compliance and enforcement of the agricultural chemical use legislation. As a result, it is clear that more attention is needed to improve comprehension of the legislation and to increase the use of incentives and economic instruments. Future steps should include applying this knowledge to the development of environmental indicators.
Peter Z. Matata has a B.sc. in Land Use Planning from the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and a M.sc. in Environmental Science with a specialization in planning and management from the University of Delft, the Netherlands.
Text Sample: Chapter 3.4, Institutional framework: Laws generally establish the institutional framework for their own enforcement by describing who will be responsible for implementing them. Without such a framework, it may be difficult to establish who is responsible for ensuring compliance has been achieved. Law makers may also want to give citizens and non-government organizations representing citizens the right to ring a lawsuit for the purpose of enforcing the law. For example, environmental laws can allow citizens to sue polluters for failing to comply with the law, and/or the government agency for failing to fulfil ist duties under the law. James et al., (2007), have argued that one of the most important design elements of any regulatory policy is how compliance with the policy will be enforced. 3.5, Reasons influencing compliance: One of the primary goals of environmental program is to change human behaviour to that environmental requirements are complied with. Another major goal of an enforcement program is to correct any immediate and serious threat to public health or the environment posed by pollution (e.g., a chemical spill that is contaminating a drinking water supply, discovery of toxic or explosive chemical wastes in an area accessible to the public. Theories about compliance provide different reasons of why individuals comply with or not comply with environment requirements. Although theories explain target groups' behaviour and the reasons behind the behaviour from different perspectives, they are derived in similar foot stone and be complementary with each other. These theories can be basically summarized into three categories. First category is rational calculation vs. Underlying norms. Some suggest that groups decide whether comply or not based on rational evaluation of the logical consequences of their actions vis-à-vis the rules in order to maximize payoffs. Other examines a wide range of factors shaping behaviour, including whether behaviour is appropriate vis-à-vis underlying norms (Zaelke et al.2005). This is quite similar as the two categories by which Grossman and other scholars classify the theories of compliance. One is the nationalist's model that focuses on deterrence and enforcement as a means to prevent and punish non-compliance by changing the actor's calculation of benefits and costs. Garry Becker (1968) his basic insight is that potential offenders respond to both the probability of detection and severity of punishment if detected and convicted. Therefore deterrence may be enhanced either by raising the penalty, by increasing monitoring activities to raise the likelihood that offender will be caught. Furthermore, deterrence theory extends the Becker model to corporate non-compliance and maintains that there must be a credible likelihood of detecting violations, swift, certain, and appropriate sanctions upon detection and sanction elements represented (Clifford et al. 2003). Stafford (2002) in his study showed that an increase in the maximum possible penalty decreased violations for hazardous waste pollutants. Another is normative model that focus on cooperation and compliance assistance as a means to prevent non compliance. They believe that compliance theories vary according to the degree they disaggregate the targets of regulations, either treating States or firms as unitary entities or recognizing that both are made up of multiple actors (Grossman et al., 2000). March and Olsen (1998) divide the basic logic of human action into the logic of consequences and the 'logic of appropriateness'. The logic of consequences views actors as choosing rationally among alternatives based on their calculations of expected consequences, whereas the logic of appropriateness sees actions as based on identities, obligations, and conceptions of appropriate actions. Without mutual exclusion, these broad categories provide a useful starting point for discussing the particular theories of compliance, and the specific approaches that flow from these different logics of action. Without mutual exclusion, these broad categories provide a useful starting discussing the particular theories of compliance, and the specific approaches that flow from different logics of action. Second category is given by environmental Pr
Environmental Law Regulations of Pesticide Usage
1
Abstract
3
Acknowledgements
4
Table of Contents
5
Glossary
7
1 Introduction
9
1.1 Problem statement
11
1.2 General objectives
12
1.3 Specific objectives
12
1.4 Research questions
12
1.5 Structure of the report
13
2. Research Methodology
13
2.1 Description of the study area
13
2.2 Methods
14
2.2.1 Problem identification
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2.2.2 Sampling procedure
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2.2.3 Pre-testing
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2.2.4 Data collection
16
2.2.5 Primary data
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2.2.6 Data analysis
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3 Literature Review
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3.1 Basic theories of compliance and enforcement
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3.1.1 Fundamentals of enforcement
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3.1.2 The importance of compliance and enforcement
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3.1.3 Promoting compliance within the regulated community
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3.1.4 Four approaches to compliance promotion
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3.2 The table of eleven and its dimensions
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3.3 The framework of enforcement
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3.4 Institutional framework
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3.5 Reasons influencing compliance
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3.6 Significant issues for effectiveness of policy implementation
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3.7 The agricultural industry and its environmental impact
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3.7.1 The regulatory environment of agriculture
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3.7.2 Hazardous practices on the environment
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3.7.3 The agricultural chemical law (The plant protection Act, 1997) in Tanzania
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4 Results and analysis
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4.1 Results of government officials
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4.2 Results of farmers
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4.2.1 Analysis
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4.2.2 Compliance estimate
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4.3 Comparison in perception between enforcers and farmers
55
5 Discussion
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6 Conclusion
63
6.1 Recommendation
64
References
66
