: Jitendra Jain
: Harmonization of International Competition Laws: Pros and Cons
: Anchor Academic Publishing
: 9783954895434
: 1
: CHF 31.20
:
: Politikwissenschaft
: English
: 96
: kein Kopierschutz/DRM
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: PDF
Since the failure of the Havana Charter in 1947 till the success of the combined efforts of leading antitrust authorities against mighty Microsoft, the antitrust regime has witnessed several ups and downs. Auf jeden Fall the journey was not an easy one. Moreover now antitrust regime is standing at international crossroads and is wondering about its future direction. Today, at this crucial juncture the antitrust world is confronted with several dilemmas simultaneously. Choices are to be made between national welfare or global welfare, national autonomy or global regulations, the efficiency factor or the fairness view, national champions or global champions, collective efficiency or collective inefficiency, WTO or ICN, the US model or the EU model and so on. It is widely believed among experts that to overcome these dilemmas, the world needs some truly unified international antitrust framework, which would enable the international community to achieve optimal product mix incorporating the best from all options and through such optimal product mix the global community can enjoy to a large extent advantages that competition policy has to offer. In this direction I have examined the feasibility and viability of unifying international competition policy in this work. Additionally, as the title suggests I have listed out advantages and disadvantages of such moves. Efforts for harmonization of competition laws began as early as in 1948. Till date there are several binding and non-binding arrangements made in the direction of harmonization. The WTO and the EU for effective coordination in antitrust area have launched recently new initiatives. International Competition Network, a forum for active interaction among antitrust officials, even though non-binding in nature is doing considerably good work. I believe such confidence building initiatives among nations would help in arriving at some amicable solutions, agreeable to all nations. Chapter 8 focuses on various such initiatives taken in the direction of harmonization. In the concluding chapter, I elaborate further on need of having a unified antitrust regime under a contemporary scenario. Recommendations and views of experts are also presented. At the end I discuss my views about feasibility of having a truly unified antitrust regime in foreseeable future and other possible alternative measures that might help in achieving harmonization in future.
Text Sample: Chapter 2.3, Enforcement Dilemma: Domestic Policies and Global Market: 'As markets integrate across national borders, the logic of purely national antitrust policy breaks down.' ' Mit dem Übergang von einer außenhandelsfokussierten (Fokus auf nationale Märkte) zu einer wettbewerbsfokussierten Perspektive (Fokus auf supranationale Märkte) bedarf auch die internationale Wettbewerbsordnung einer wettbewerbspolitischen Dimension.' Simultaneous existence of domestic policies with national jurisdiction and global markets with global reach calls for urgent creation of some mechanism to cover cross border competition problems. National competition can effectively deal with cross border disputes only when foreign entities have de facto presence and substantial stake within its jurisdiction and that too only when national law apply. Antitrust pundits call for some form of international mechanism because they believe national laws suffer form inherent deficiency in dealing with cross border disputes, 'when foreign supplier does not have a commercial presence.'. Existing framework of national laws with some collaborative international agreements very often fails to check inter country anti-competitive behavior and to be precise, cross border spillovers. Additionally, rules and procedures available under existing arrangements i.e. cooperation agreements are cumbersome and very often pose administrative problems. Compliance of such rules necessitates additional transaction costs. Global Marketplace has led to emergence of international cartels. Actions against such offenders may take place in more than one jurisdiction. Big firms may enjoy dominant position in markets of more than one country and circumstances may require thorough simultaneous investigation by antitrust authorities from various countries. Merger between domestic company and foreign entity might need approval from different authorities individually. Such situations pose additional administrative burden on authorities and needless to say additional financial burden for both authorities as well as firms. Creation of any globally valid antitrust mechanism will definitely lead to large financial savings. Taxpayers' precious money could be used for other constructive purposes. 2.4, Need for Unifying Global Competition Policy: Justus Haucap et al list out various reasons for harmonization of competition policy. In the absence of a globally valid antitrust regime, companies having presence in various countries have to deal with antitrust authorities of each country individually. S
Harmonization of International Competition Laws: Pros and Cons1
Index3
Executive Summary5
1 Antitrust or Competition Policy: Magna Carta of free enterprise8
1.1 Evolution of Antitrust Regime: Antitrust 1.0, Antitrust 2.08
88
1.2 The Great Antitrust Paradigm Shift14
1.3 Contemporary Antitrust World16
1.4 Aims of Competition Policy17
1.5 Pillars of Antitrust Mechanism: The Efficiency Factor17
2017
1.6 An Important Task: Create perfect blend of efficiency andfairness22
1.7 An Overview of Antitrust Regulation of various countries23
1.8 In a Nutshell26
2. Global Markets need Global Governance27
2.1 Puzzle: Whether there is need for unifying international competition policy?27
2.2 Need for Global Competition Laws28
2.3 Enforcement Dilemma: Domestic Policies and Global Market31
2.4 Need for Unifying Global Competition Policy32
2.5 Need for International Dispute Settlement Mechanism33
2.6 In a Nutshell34
3 Benefits of unifying Antitrust Regulations35
3.1 Transaction Cost35
3.2 Ready availability of expertise35
3.3 Maximization of Consumer Welfare36
3.4 Maximization of Global Welfare37
3.5 Efficient Allocation of World Resources38
3.6 Harmonization leads to increment in Productivity38
3.7 Collective Efficiency vs. Collective Inefficiency39
3.8 In a Nutshell40
4 Unifying Competition laws: Areas of Harmonization40
4.1 Unifying Substantive Regulations40
4.2 Unifying Procedural Aspects41
4.3 Unifying Level of Enforcement42
4.4 In a Nutshell42
5 Limitations of Harmonization42
5.1 Political Reasons42
5.2 Social Areas43
5.3 Other Reasons43
5.4 In a Nutshell44
6 Conflict Areas45
6.1 Conceptual Discord45
6.2 National Welfare vs. Global Welfare46
6.3 Economic Structure of Countries47
6.4 Erosion of National Autonomy48
6.5 Intergovernmental Disputes49
6.6 Spillover Effects49
6.7 Extending beyond Nation’s Jurisdiction50
6.8 Enforcement Mechanism53
6.9 Jurisdiction Conflicts and Confusions53
6.10 In a Nutshell54
7 Other Modalities of Cooperation55
7.1 Unilateral Approach55
7.2 Bilateral Form of Cooperation56
7.3 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Agreements (MLATs)61
7.4 Multilateral Form of Cooperation62
7.5 In a Nutshell64
8 Various Initiatives65
8.1 International Trade Organization (ITO)65
8.2 GATT65
8.3 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)67
8.4 At EU level67
8.5 The UN Set69
8.6 World Trade Organization (WTO)70
8.7 International Competition Network (ICN)71
8.8 In a Nutshell74
9 Concluding Remarks75
9.1 The Mystery of Antitrust 4.075
9.2 Their Remarks76
9.3 My Observations79
Appendix82
Appendix I: Countries with formal Antitrust Regime82
Appendix II: Statistics of Mega Mergers Worldwide83
Appendix III: Statistics of Cross Border Mergers84
Appendix IV: Mergers and Acquisitions by Foreign Controlled Firms (SelectedCountries)85
Appendix V: Impact of International Cartel on Developing and least Developed Nations86
Appendix VI: National and Regional Antitrust Budget87
Appendix VII: Benchmark of Market Dominance in different Economies88
Appendix VIII: Details of Notifications exchanged between competition authoritiesof the EC and the US89
References90