Why Good People Go Bad:
A Case Study of the Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse Courts-Martial
Alan L. Hensley, PhD Candidate, BCETS, FAAETS
Abstract
Problems cannot be solved at the same level of awareness that created them. More than three years have elapsed since the revelation of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib Prison. Careers have been ruined and lives inextricably altered. Ten court-martials have occurred, with another soon approaching. However, the endemic factors that led to the abuses have yet to be addressed. This article addresses the events in context of well-grounded psychological, sociological, and criminological theory and research.
Introduction
More than three years have elapsed since Military Police Sergeant Joseph Darby first alerted the U.S. Criminal Justice Command to alleged prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison complex. To support his allegation, Darby provided a compact disc of images of naked prisoners, being forced into homosexual activity and other degrading acts as American military men and women looked on. The revelations sparked one of the most intense investigations undertaken in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
In April 2004, the television program,60 Minutes broke the story of the alleged abuse of prisoners with graphic pictures to the world. The images sparked international outrage. To quell the furor, it became apparent that the military hierarchy must demonstrate disapproval of the behavior of the participating members of the 372nd Military Police Battalion.
In July 2003, General Sanchez, Commanding Officer of the United Central Command, relieved Brigadier General Janis Karpenski of command of the facility, replacing her with Major General Geoffrey Miller, former Commander of the controversial Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility in Cuba.
Eleven other persons formerly assigned to Abu Ghraib have since been subjected to court martial. Each defendant has been found guilty of violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and sentenced accordingly. To the population not indoctrinated in the effects and comorbidity associated with complex traumatic stress, the problem has been resolved. However, the author suggests that the chosen solution has merely produced a scab on an insidious wound.
It is widely recognized that problems cannot be solved at the same level of awareness that created them. To understand and address the causal factors, one must first study the etiology that defines the environment that produced the problematic behavior.
The Situation
As Coalition Forces assumed control of Iraq, the question remained of what to do with the thousands of prisoners taken into custody. Perceived as the most viable immediate solution was the notorious Abu Ghraib Prison, located twenty miles west of Baghdad. During the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, the Abu Ghraib Prison had a reputation as a place of torture and execution of thousands of political prisoners. However, during the collapse of the Hussein Regime, the facility was stripped of any artifact that could be removed; including doors, windows, toilets, showers, and even large sections of brick. Hurriedly, the Coalition had the cells cleaned and repaired. Toilets, showers, and a new medical facility were added.
Oddly, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, a Reserve Intelligence Officer, without any training in correctional facility operation, was placed in charge of all of the military prisons in Iraq. In June of 2003, Karpenski found herself in charge of three large prisons, eight battalions, and 3,400 Army Reservists. Most of those persons she commanded, like herself, had no training or experience in correctional operations. Despite the obvious shortcomings, the prison population, which at times reportedly exceeded as many as 50,000 detainees, soon included high-value leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces, others suspected of crimes against the coalition, as well as common criminals. Taguba noted in ex-post-facto testimony that the facility was filled beyond capacity and the guards were greatly outnumbered and short of resources. In addition to repeatedly requesting additional personnel, supplies, and other assistance, Karpinski had repeate
