| Preface: What is at Issue? | 9 |
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| Remarks on the Method and the Manner of this Book | 16 |
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| Chapter I: On Imagining | 21 |
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| I.1 Ryle on imagining | 22 |
| I.2 Dennett (and Ryle) on imagining | 31 |
| I.3 Bennett | 31 |
| 40 | 31 |
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| I.4 Husserl on imagining | 54 |
| I.5 Wittgenstein (in contrast to Husserl) on imagining | 79 |
| Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter I, and remarks on matters of translation | 110 |
| Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental Life | 123 |
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| II.1 Against privatism and eliminativism | 123 |
| II.2 Subjective and intersubjective knowledge of the inward mental life | 136 |
| II.2.1 Ryle and Wittgenstein against introspection (reflexive experience) | 140 |
| II.2.2 Wittgenstein’s argument against knowledge of the inward mental life | 169 |
| II.2.3 Wittgenstein and Gorgias | 185 |
| II.3 The true nature of consciousness, and its true epistemological consequences | 192 |
| II.3.1 The root of Wittgensteinianism | 220 |
| II.3.2 Knowing one’s own mind and the minds of others | 229 |
| II.4 Coda: the second-person point of view | 239 |
| Appendix to Chapter II: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter II, and remarks on matters of translation | 246 |
| Chapter III: On Intending | 267 |
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| III.1 A prologue: epoché | 267 |
| III.2 Technical intentionality-predicates | 268 |
| III.3 The great divide in intentionality theory – first part: Ryle (and Wittgenstein) versus Husserl | 271 |
| III.3.1 Rylean Husserl and non-Rylean Husserl | 286 |
| III.3.2 Does Husserl’s theory of intentionality lead to idealism? | 299 |
| III.4 The great divide in intentionality theory – second part: Wittgenstein versus Husserl | 310 |
| III.4.1 In corroboration of the thesis that Wittgenstein is an intentionality nihilist | 326 |
| III.5 Dennett’s nihilism regarding intentionality | 335 |
| III.6 Bennett | 335 |
| 345 | 335 |
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| III.7 The Wittgenstein-syndrome in the theory of intentionality | 351 |
| III.8 Wittgenstein’s profundity | 367 |
| Appendix to Chapter III: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter III, and remarks on matters of translation | 371 |
| Chapter IV: On the Literature | 381 |
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| IV.1 Husserl without introspection? | 381 |
| IV.2 On the difficulty of saying the phenomenological truth in the best possible way | 394 |
| IV.2.1 Thompson on reflexive (or reflective) experience, inner experience, introspection | 394 |
| IV.2.2 Thompson on representationalism | 405 |
| IV.2.3 Thompson on imagining | 409 |
| IV.3 Was Husserl an externalist? | 416 |
| IV.4 Husserl’s theory of intentionality misinterpreted | 439 |
| IV.4.1 The Bell does not toll for Husserl’s theory of intentionality | 454 |
| IV.5 Four views of a Wittgensteinian | 464 |
| IV.5.1 The first view (concerning introspection) | 464 |
| IV.5.2 The second view (concerning Anscombe’s mistranslation of “Vorstellung” and, allegedly, of “Bild”) | 467 |
| IV.5.3 The third view (concerning the intentionality of imaginings | 470 |
| IV.5.4 The fourth view (concerning the ontological and epistemological status of imaginings) | 474 |
| IV.6 Among the blind, the one-eyed is king | 480 |
| IV.7 Referentialism and anti-referentialism | 486 |
| IV.8 Husserl and the Clash of the Four Giants | 490 |
| Appendix to Chapter IV: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter IV, and remarks on matters of translation | 503 |
| Bibliography | 513 |
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| Index of labelled quotations from Bennett | 513 |
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| 520 | 513 |
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| Index of other quoted authors | 527 |
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