| 1 Introduction | 11 |
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| 2 Supervenience | 17 |
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| 2.1 Supervenience | 19 |
| 2.2 Covariance | 23 |
| 2.3 Covariance and Ontological Priority | 30 |
| 2.4 Covariance and Modal Supervenience | 35 |
| 2.5 Modal Supervenience and Explanation | 40 |
| 2.6 Explaining Explanations | 48 |
| A Strong and Global Supervenience | 59 |
| A.1 Kim’s Attempted Equivalence Proof | 60 |
| A.2 Non-Equivalence Examples | 62 |
| A.3 Restricted Entailment? | 65 |
| A.4 Against Restricted Entailment | 67 |
| 3 Concrete Possible Worlds | 73 |
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| 3.1 Possibility and Possible Worlds | 74 |
| 3.2 The Analysis Claim | 76 |
| 3.3 Lewis Worlds | 77 |
| 3.4 The Irrelevance Objection | 80 |
| 3.4.1 Against IO1 | 81 |
| 3.4.2 Against IO2 | 85 |
| 3.4.3 Against IO3 | 90 |
| 3.5 Counterparts | 93 |
| 3.6 Actual Problems for Lewis | 100 |
| 3.6.1 Possible Non-Existence | 100 |
| 3.6.2 Surprises | 103 |
| 3.6.3 Actuality | 105 |
| 3.7 Lewisian Explanations | 111 |
| 4 Abstract Possible Worlds | 117 |
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| 4.1 Something from Nothing | 119 |
| 4.1.1 Pleonastic Properties | 121 |
| 4.1.2 Something-from-Nothing Entailment Claims | 124 |
| 4.1.3 Property Concepts | 131 |
| 4.1.4 True SNECs | 139 |
| 4.2 Pleonastic Possible Worlds | 156 |
| 4.3 Objections and Clarifications | 171 |
| 4.3.1 Existence | 172 |
| 4.3.2 Explanation | 175 |
| 4.3.3 Competitors | 181 |
| 5 Possibility and Probability | 185 |
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| 5.1 Initial Motivation | 187 |
| 5.2 Different Kinds of Probability | 192 |
| 5.2.1 Epistemic Probabilities | 193 |
| 5.2.2 Objective Probabilities | 198 |
| 5.3 The Temporal Structure of ‘Might’s | 205 |
| 5.3.1 Might | 205 |
| 5.3.2 Might Have | 210 |
| 5.3.3 Different Readings | 214 |
| 5.4 DeRose on ‘Might’ Sentences | 218 |
| 5.5 Supervenience | 228 |
| 5.6 Objective and Metaphysical Possibility | 233 |
| 6 Conclusion | 241 |
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| Appendix A Non-Nominal Quantification | 245 |
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| Name Index | 261 |
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| Bibliography | 265 |
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