: Patrick X. Monaghan
: Property Possession as Identity An Essay in Metaphysics
: Walter de Gruyter GmbH& Co.KG
: 9783110325744
: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical AnalysisISSN
: 1
: CHF 120.30
:
: 20. und 21. Jahrhundert
: English
: 191
: Wasserzeichen
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.
CHAPTER I11
INTRODUCTION11
1. A long-neglected dispute between Plato and Aristotle.111
2. The account to be defended.14
3. Some potential misconceptions about my account.20
4. The highly metaphorical nature of other accounts.24
5. An historical precedent for my account.27
6. The plan.29
7. Some methodological points about my account.31
8. Some methodological points about the problem my account solves.38
9. A theory of properties.44
9.1. What is it for something to be a property?47
9.2. What are the existence-conditions for properties?51
9.3. What are the individuation-conditions for properties?70
AGAINST INTERNALISM71
1. Introduction.71
2. Against Paul’s view.73
3. Against Denkel’s view.78
4. The view of Aristotle.80
5. Against Internalism in general.84
CHAPTER III85
AGAINST EXTERNALISM85
1. Introduction.85
2. Against Predicate Nominalism.85
3. Against Concept Nominalism.89
4. Against Class Nominalism.91
5. Against Resemblance Nominalism.93
CHAPTER II71
5.1. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s version of the view.94
5.2. The mind-dependence of resemblance.96
5.3. The argument.101
6. Against Traditional Externalism.103
7. Against Externalism in general.104
CHAPTER IV105
THE VIEW OF PLATO105
1. Introduction.105
2. Plato’s view for sensible things.105
3. A novel interpretation of Plato’s theory of forms.115
4. Plato on the self predication of the forms.120
5. Plato and the third man.129
6. Evaluation of Plato’s view.134
CHAPTER V137
AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS137
1. Introduction.137
2. Against the view of Armstrong.137
3. Against the view of Zalta.148
4. Against hybrid views in general.149
5. Against Baxter’s view.149
CHAPTER VI155
PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY155
1. Introduction.155
2. Premise one:155
3. Premise two:158
4. Premise three:158
5. Premise four:158
CHAPTER VII175
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES175
1. Introduction.175
2. The nature of an entity.175
3. N and its truth.178
4. Objections and replies.178
4.1. The many over the one.178
4.2. The one over the many.179
4.3. Property possession and predication.180
4.4. The ‘is’ of predication and the ‘is’ of identity.183
4.5. My account and change.184
4.6. My account and modality.185
4.7. A world of properties alone.186
5. The substratum versus the bundle theories.188
6. The problem of property-unification.189
7. The problem of the principle of individuation.192
BIBLIOGRAPHY197