| Introduction | 11 |
|---|
| PART I: Reduction in Philosophy of Science | 15 |
|---|
| Introduction | 17 |
| 1. Reduction: From Derivations of Theories to Ruthless Metascience | 19 |
| 2. Mechanistic Explanation | 29 |
| 3. The Interventionist Account of Causation | 39 |
| 4. Levels | 45 |
| Conclusions: Reductionism vs. Explanatory pluralism | 57 |
| PART II: Rethinking Reduction in Philosophy of Mind | 59 |
|---|
| Introduction | 61 |
| 5. Traditional Approaches to Reduction in Philosophy of Mind | 63 |
| 5.1. British Emergentism | 63 |
| 5.2. Logical Behaviorism and Identity Theory | 69 |
| 5.3. Multiple Realizability | 72 |
| 5.4. The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis | 78 |
| 5.5. Functionalism | 81 |
| 5.6. The Dream of Nonreductive Physicalism | 86 |
| 6. Functional Reduction | 91 |
| 6.1. The Causal Exclusion Argument and the Functional Model | 91 |
| 6.2. Kim vs. Nagel | 96 |
| 6.3. Dissecting the Functional Model | 98 |
| 6.3.1. Functionalization | 99 |
| 6.3.2. Realization | 102 |
| 6.3.3. Causation | 106 |
| 6.4. Functional Reduction as Mechanistic Explanation | 110 |
| 7. Phenomenal Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap | 113 |
| 8. New Type Physicalism | 123 |
| Conclusions: Rethinking Reduction in Philosophy of Mind | 135 |
| PART III: A New Framework for Philosophy of Mind | 137 |
|---|
| Introduction | 139 |
| 9. Explanatory Pluralism for Philosophy of Mind | 141 |
| 10. From Explanatory Pluralism to Pluralistic Physicalism | 147 |
| 11. Pluralistic Physicalism and Causal Exclusion Worries | 157 |
| 12. Dimensions of Explanatory Power | 165 |
| Conclusions and Directions for Further Research | 173 |
| References | 177 |