: Dana Riesenfeld
: The Rei(g)n of 'Rule' Rei(g)n of 'Rule'
: Walter de Gruyter GmbH& Co.KG
: 9783110321869
: AporiaISSN
: 1
: CHF 110.90
:
: 20. und 21. Jahrhundert
: English
: 132
: Wasserzeichen
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
< >The Rei(g)n of Rule is a study of rules and their role in language. Rules have dominated the philosophical arena as a fundamental philosophical concept. Little progress, however, has been made in reaching an accepted definition of rules. This fact is not coincidental. The concept of rule is expected to perform various, at times conflicting, tasks. Analyzing key debates and rule related discussions in the philosophy of language I show that typically rules are perceived and defined either as norms or as conventions. As norms, rules perform the evaluative task of distinguishing between correct and incorrect actions. As conventions, rules describe how certain actions are actually undertaken. As normative and conventional requirements do not necessarily coincide, the concept of rule cannot simultaneously accommodate both. The impossibility to consistently define 'rule' has gone unnoticed by philosophers, and it is in this sense that 'rule' has also blocked philosophical attempts to explain language in terms of rules.

I8
88
1. Why norms are not conventions and conventions are not norms18
1.1 The tension of normativity18
1.2 Two concepts of arbitrariness: Saussure and Lewis20
1.3 Can conventions become norms?29
1.4 Rules32
2. Cavell on normative necessity: The philosopher, the baker, and the pantomime of caution36
2.1 “I am less interested now in the “mean” than I am in the “must””36
2.2 “Here the pantomime of caution concludes”38
2.3 “…the hopelessness of speaking, in a general way, about the “normativeness” of expressions”40
II. Rules as conventions vs. rules as norms in the rule-following debates46
3. What is a rule and what ought it to be46
3.1 The reduction of rules to conventions vs. the reduction of rules to norms46
3.2 Kripke: The reduction of rules to conventions147
3.3 Baker and Hacker: The reduction of rules to norms59
3.4 Meredith Williams on normative necessity70
3.5 Cora Diamond: Rules and their right place82
III. Twisted Language90
4. Davidson on rules, conventions and norms90
4.1. Normativity without conventionality90
4.2 Communication without rules or conventions90
4.3 “The second person” vs. the community view97
4.4 The two kinds of normativity100
4.5 The unpacking of ‘ought’18106
4.6 Normativity without norms109
5. Searle on rules (of rationality, conversation and speech acts)116
5.1 The shortcut argument against rule116
5.2 Is language a rule governed form of behavior or is it not?117
5.3 (No) Rules of conversation118
5.4 Background brought to the foreground123
Conclusion126