| Preface | 7 |
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| Contents | 9 |
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| Introduction | 13 |
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| 1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem? | 21 |
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| 1.1 What is conceptual analysis? | 21 |
| 1.2 From Frege to Kripke and Putnam | 25 |
| 2 Two-dimensionalism and the necessary a posteriori | 33 |
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| 2.1 Two-dimensionalism | 33 |
| 2.1.1 Primary and secondary intensions | 33 |
| 2.1.2 Metaphysical plenitude and two-fold world dependence | 37 |
| 2.1.3 Scrutability and canonical descriptions | 42 |
| 2.1.4 Two-dimensionalism and Jackson’s descriptivism | 46 |
| 2.1.5 Two notions of apriority | 50 |
| 2.2 Modal illusions according to Kripke and according to twodimensionalism | 54 |
| 2.2.1 Kripke’s two models of modal error | 56 |
| 2.2.2 Doubts about the accounts of modal error | 58 |
| 2.2.2.1 Doubts about the epistemic counterpart model | 58 |
| 2.2.2.2 Doubts about the reference fixer model | 65 |
| 2.3 Summary and outlook: What has been shown and what is yet to be shown | 70 |
| 3 The challenge from the epistemic arguments | 77 |
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| 3.1 Primary intensions and the epistemic arguments | 80 |
| 3.1.1 The primary intensions of natural kind terms | 84 |
| 3.1.1.1 Vagueness | 92 |
| 3.1.1.2 Intersubjective variation and the individuation of concepts . | 94 |
| 3.1.2 Semantic deference and the primary intensions of names | 96 |
| 3.1.2.1 The argument from Ignorance and Error | 98 |
| 3.1.2.2 Deferential concepts and the alleged problem of circularity | 99 |
| 3.1.2.3 Deferential concepts and apriority | 104 |
| 3.1.2.4 Two methods for detecting deferential concepts and two problems for two-dimensionalism | 106 |
| 3.2 Linguistic meaning, mental content, and two-dimensionalism | 110 |
| 4 Primary intensions, defining the subject, and communication | 121 |
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| 4.1 Defining the subject | 122 |
| 4.1.1 A case for the epistemic thesis | 127 |
| 4.1.1.1 From (CJ) to (CJ+) – Schroeter’s improv model | 129 |
| 4.1.1.2 From (CJ+) to (CJ++) | 145 |
| 4.1.2 The failure of the semantic thesis | 149 |
| 4.2 Two-dimensional communication | 153 |
| 4.2.1 The semantic thesis | 156 |
| 4.2.1.1 Communication involving indexical expressions | 158 |
| 4.2.1.2 Communication involving proper names | 163 |
| 4.2.1.3 Communication involving natural kind terms | 167 |
| 4.2.2 The epistemic thesis | 169 |
| 4.2.2.1 The importance of shared primary intensions | 170 |
| 4.2.2.2 How primary intensions help to promote co-reference even when they are not shared | 175 |
| 4.2.2.2.1 Proper names | 176 |
| 4.2.2.2.2 Natural kind terms | 178 |
| 5 Epistemic transparency and epistemic opacity | 181 |
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| 5.1 Arguments for ubiquitous opacity | 182 |
| 5.1.1 Millikan | 183 |
| 5.1.2 Putnam | 185 |
| 5.1.3 Kornblith | 187 |
| 5.2 Revealing opacity | 194 |
| 5.2.1 Revealing opacity via the function of a term | 195 |
| 5.2.2 Revealing opacity via considerations about hypothetical cases | 197 |
| 5.2.3 Can opacity be determined a priori? | 199 |
| 5.3 The value of opaque terms in conceptual analysis | 206 |
| 5.3.1 Discovering essences | 207 |
| 5.3.2 Variation in primary intensions | 208 |
| 6 Scrutability, primary intensions, and conceptual analysis | 213 |
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| 6.1 Scrutability and primary intensions | 214 |
| 6.1.1 From descriptivism to the scrutability thesis | 217 |
| 6.1.2 A case for (CJ) | 223 |
| 6.1.2.1 Argument from metaphysical plenitude | 224 |
| 6.1.2.2 Arguments from the scrutability of specific kinds of facts . | 225 |
| 6.1.2.3 Arguments from the absence of clear counterexamples | 227 |
| 6.1.2.4 Arguments from the epistemic indispensability of scrutability | 230 |
| 6.2 Semantic idealizations and epistemic reality | 234 |
| 6.2.1 Are primary intensions too coarse-grained? | 235 |
| 6.2.2 Scrutability for real subjects | 239 |
| 6.2.2.1 The two-level model | 245 |
| 6.2.2.2 Approaching ideal judgments | 254 |
| 7 The trouble with definitions and the aims of conceptual analysis | 261 |
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| 7.1 The aims of conceptual analysis | 263 |
| 7.1.1 Definitions – complete, partial, and absent | 263 |
| 7.1.2 Reductive explanations | 267 |
| 7.1.3 The Canberra Plan | 274 |
| 7.1.3.1 Ramsey sentences, primary intensions and unique reference | 278 |
| 7.1.3.2 The scope of the Canberra Plan | 280 |
| 7.1.3.3 The practicability of the Canberra Plan | 283 |
| 7.2 The trouble with definitions | 286 |
| 7.2.1 Adequacy conditions for definitions | 286 |
| 7.2.2 Objections to the eligibility of definitions | 290 |
| 7.2.2.1 Objections from the relation between definiendum and everything else | 290 |
| 7.2.2.2 Objections from the format of concepts | 294 |
| 7.2.3 The absence of successful definitions and some reasons for optimism | 297 |
| 8 Concluding remarks | 303 |
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| References | 309 |
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