: Fred Wilson
: Body, Mind and Self in Hume's Critical Realism
: Walter de Gruyter GmbH& Co.KG
: 9783110327076
: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical AnalysisISSN
: 1
: CHF 222.90
:
: Deutscher Idealismus, 19. Jahrhundert
: English
: 512
: Wasserzeichen
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
Acknowledgments6
Note7
Table of Contents9
Introduction13
Chapter OneSelf as Substance29
(1) The Substance Tradition129
(2) The Metaphysics of Morals38
(3) Morality and the Substantial Self Untied45
(4) Human Nature Defended54
(5) George Grant: Aristotelian Moral Philosophy Made Modern81
(6) Another Sort of Mind98
(7) Minds as Bundles106
Endnotes to Chapter One108
Chapter TwoNominalism and Acquaintance115
(1) Individuation and Nominalism118
(2) The Principle of Acquaintance in Locke and Hume120
(3) The Appeal to Acquaintance: Empiricism vs. Descartes133
(4) Hume’s Nominalism137
(5) Nominalism and Relations142
(6) Nominalism, Causation, Substances and Things151
Endnotes to Chapter Two194
Chapter ThreeFrom the Substance Tradition through Locketo Hume:Ordinary Things and Critical Realism203
(1) Up to Locke203
(2) From Locke to Hume9208
(3) Hume’s Causal Inference to Critical Realism226
(4) The System of the Vulgar as False, Inevitable and Reasonable236
(5) The World of the Philosophers244
(6) Conclusion253
Endnotes to Chapter Three258
The Disappearance of the Simple Self: ItsProblems263
(1) Substance and Self in Locke1263
(2) The Contents of the Humean Mind270
(3) Explaining Consciousness295
(4) Privacy and Other Minds324
(5) The Problem of the Self in Hume365
Endnotes to Chapter Four373
Chapter FiveHume’s Positive Account of the Self387
(1) Mind and Body387
(2) The Bodily Criterion407
(3) Humean Persons415
(4) Becoming Our Selves483
(5) Conclusion – The Final One500
Endnotes to Chapter Five510
Bibliography519