: Javier Cumpa, Erwin Tegtmeier
: Phenomenological Realism Versus Scientific Realism Reinhardt Grossmann - David M. Armstrong Metaphysical Correspondence
: Walter de Gruyter GmbH& Co.KG
: 9783110326062
: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical AnalysisISSN
: 1
: CHF 111.40
:
: 20. und 21. Jahrhundert
: English
: 139
: Wasserzeichen
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
The two eminent metaphysicians Armstrong and Grossmann exchanged letters for ten years in which they discussed crucial points of their respective ontologies. They have a common basis. Both do metaphysics proper and not linguistic philosophy. Both advocate universals and acknowledge the key position of the category of states of affairs. However, they differ on the simplicity of universals and the nature of states of affairs. There is also a fundamental methodological disagreement between them. Armstrong accepts only the evidence of natural science and has a materialist view on mind while Grossmann is a dualist and grants also the same evidential status to the phenomenological data of perception and introspection. The letters are grouped into three phases. The first is the issue of universals, the second the ontological analysis of laws of nature and the third the ontology of numbers. The book contains also longer comments and reviews, partly not published until now.

Table of Contents5
Acknowledgements9
Preface11
Introduction13
Beginning: Universals19
The Start21
On the Simplicity of Universals25
On the Complexity of Universals26
The Phenomenological Argument for the Simplicity of Universals27
The Scientific Argument for the Complexity of Universals28
Objections30
A Reply to Objections31
A Legacy: Gustav Bergman33
A Legacy: John Anderson34
The Nature of Universals35
A Reply51
1. Grossmann on Exemplification52
2. Are there Conjunctive Properties?55
3. Structural Properties58
4. Ontology and the Physical Universe59
Objections63
A Reply to Objections69
Universals and Classes: A Question72
Universals and Classes: An Answer73
Objections74
A Reply to Objections75
Middle: Laws of Nature77
Laws of Nature as Quantified Facts79
Laws of Nature as Connectionsbetween Universals80
An Objection82
A Reply84
An Epistemological Problem:The Synthetic A Priori Truths85
A Solution: Causation87
An Objection: Induction89
End:The Nature of Numbers91
A Coincidence93
Numbers Tied to Aggregates94
An Objection: On Mereological Categories95
A Reply: On Mereological Categories98
Aggregates and Sets: A Question99
Aggregates and Sets: An Answer101
A Problem: Wholes and Mereological Sums103
A Solution: The Identity Conditions for Mereological Sums105
Concluding Remarks on Numbers andMereology107
Appendices109
1. Reinhardt Grossmann’s Ontology111
2. Comments on Armstrong’s “Universals”127
3. Comments on Grossmann’s“The Existence of the World”131
Bibliography137