From Psychology to Neuroscience A New Reductive Account
:
Patrice Soom
:
From Psychology to Neuroscience A New Reductive Account
:
Walter de Gruyter GmbH& Co.KG
:
9783110322620
:
Epistemische Studien / Epistemic StudiesISSN
:
1
:
CHF 159.70
:
:
20. und 21. Jahrhundert
:
English
:
318
:
Wasserzeichen
:
PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
:
PDF
This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
7
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
9
1.1 The mind-body problem in philosophy of mind
9
1.2 The metaphysical issue of mental causation
11
1.3 The epistemological reducibility of psychology
14
1.4 Outline
16
Chapter 2 THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION
19
2.1 Objects, events and properties: preliminary remarks
19
2.2 Premises of the problem of mental causation
23
2.3 Inconsistency of the premises
37
2.4 Typology of possible positions in philosophy of mind
38
2.5 Summary and transition
55
Chapter 3 ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM
57
3.1 Classical type-identity
58
3.2 Multiple realization in an ontological context
62
3.3 Supervenience
67
3.4 The causal completeness: psychology and physics
83
3.5 Non-reductive physicalism
87
3.6 The causal argument for the token-identity thesis
90
3.7 The token-identity thesis as ontological reductionism
94
3.8 Summary and transition
105
Chapter 4 PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE
107
4.1 General background
108
4.2 Folks psychology as a functional theory of the mind
112
4.3 Neuroscience
144
4.4 Summary and transition
171
Chapter 5 EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM
175
5.1 Why epistemological reductionism?
176
5.2 Classical reductionism and the requirements of reduction
180
5.3 Multiple realization in an epistemological context
186
5.4 Overcoming multiple realization
197
5.5 The general dilemma of multiple realization
216
5.6 Summary and transition
218
Chapter 6 REDUCTION BY MEANS OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES
221
6.1 What should be expected from any account of epistemological reductionism?
222
6.2 Starting point: an implication of multiple realization
224
6.3 Reduction by means of functionally defined subtypes
228
6.4 Summary and transition
251
Chapter 7 REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO NEUROSCIENCE:CASES STUDIES
255
7.1 How it works: guidelines to reducibility in principle
256
7.2 Finding critical conditions of manifestations
268
7.3 Down to neurobiology
281
7.4 Summary and transition
293
Chapter 8 FINAL REMARKS
295
8.1 Complete reductionism
295
8.2 Conservative reductionism
298
8.3 Back to the mind-body problem
301
BIBLIOGRAPHY
305
INDEX
317
