: Jonathan Berg
: Direct Belief An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief
: De Gruyter Mouton
: 9781614510826
: Mouton Series in Pragmatics [MSP]ISSN
: 1
: CHF 124.20
:
: Allgemeine und Vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft
: English
: 167
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
< >Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted 'Inner Speech' Picture of Thought. The work serves as a case study in pragmatic explanation, dealing also with methodological issues about context-sensitivity in language and the relation between semantics and pragmatics.

br />
< >Jonathan Berg, University of Haifa, Israel.

Preface6
Acknowledgements8
Introduction12
Chapter 1: The instability of belief ascriptions (and how not to explain it)18
1. From language to thought18
2. Accommodating shifty intuitions21
3. The appeal to ambiguity23
3.1. Lexical ambiguity23
3.2. Syntactic ambiguity28
3.3. Multigrade status32
3.4. The persistence of shifty intuitions35
4. The indexical view35
4.1. Implicit modes of presentation35
4.2. Hidden-indexical semantics38
4.3. Articulated indexicality47
5. Semantic indeterminacy51
5.1. Incompleteness51
5.2. Similarity53
5.3. Hopelessness57
6. Direct belief59
7. Summary60
Chapter 2: The pragmatics of substitutivity65
1. Truth and appropriateness65
2. Conversational implicature67
3. Implicated normalcy68
4. Normalcy for belief ascriptions71
5. Variations on verbatim acceptability74
6. Identity beliefs81
7. Availability86
8. Semantic intuitions93
9. Iterability102
10. Other pragmatic accounts of substitution failure106
10.1. Soames and what is said106
10.2. Thau and what is implicated110
11. Summary114
Chapter 3: Conceptions, belief, and “inner speech”119
1. The medium view of conceptions119
2. The behavior problem122
2.1. The problem122
2.2. The Higher Order View of conceptions124
2.3. A solution to the problem125
3. Suspended belief126
4. The inner speech picture of thought134
5. Thinking in words141
5.1. Silent uttering141
5.2. Imagining145
6. Two paradigms of belief148
7. Summary151
References154
Index164