| Preface | 6 |
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| Acknowledgements | 8 |
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| Introduction | 12 |
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| Chapter 1: The instability of belief ascriptions (and how not to explain it) | 18 |
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| 1. From language to thought | 18 |
| 2. Accommodating shifty intuitions | 21 |
| 3. The appeal to ambiguity | 23 |
| 3.1. Lexical ambiguity | 23 |
| 3.2. Syntactic ambiguity | 28 |
| 3.3. Multigrade status | 32 |
| 3.4. The persistence of shifty intuitions | 35 |
| 4. The indexical view | 35 |
| 4.1. Implicit modes of presentation | 35 |
| 4.2. Hidden-indexical semantics | 38 |
| 4.3. Articulated indexicality | 47 |
| 5. Semantic indeterminacy | 51 |
| 5.1. Incompleteness | 51 |
| 5.2. Similarity | 53 |
| 5.3. Hopelessness | 57 |
| 6. Direct belief | 59 |
| 7. Summary | 60 |
| Chapter 2: The pragmatics of substitutivity | 65 |
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| 1. Truth and appropriateness | 65 |
| 2. Conversational implicature | 67 |
| 3. Implicated normalcy | 68 |
| 4. Normalcy for belief ascriptions | 71 |
| 5. Variations on verbatim acceptability | 74 |
| 6. Identity beliefs | 81 |
| 7. Availability | 86 |
| 8. Semantic intuitions | 93 |
| 9. Iterability | 102 |
| 10. Other pragmatic accounts of substitution failure | 106 |
| 10.1. Soames and what is said | 106 |
| 10.2. Thau and what is implicated | 110 |
| 11. Summary | 114 |
| Chapter 3: Conceptions, belief, and “inner speech” | 119 |
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| 1. The medium view of conceptions | 119 |
| 2. The behavior problem | 122 |
| 2.1. The problem | 122 |
| 2.2. The Higher Order View of conceptions | 124 |
| 2.3. A solution to the problem | 125 |
| 3. Suspended belief | 126 |
| 4. The inner speech picture of thought | 134 |
| 5. Thinking in words | 141 |
| 5.1. Silent uttering | 141 |
| 5.2. Imagining | 145 |
| 6. Two paradigms of belief | 148 |
| 7. Summary | 151 |
| References | 154 |
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| Index | 164 |