ebook ebooks e-book e-books downloaden bei MyEbooks.ch downloaden

The Decision to Patent

:	Alexandra Zaby
:	The Decision to Patent
:	Physica-Verlag
:	9783790826128
:	1
:	CHF 85.30
:

:	Volkswirtschaft
:	English

:	166
:	Wasserzeichen/DRM
:	PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
:	PDF

This book provides a thorough analysis of the decision to apply for a patent. Unlike many other theoretical approaches, the negative effect a patent may have due to the disclosure requirement linked to every patent application is taken into account. Seen in this light, the effects driving the propensity to patent can be identified as the opposing forces of a protective and a disclosure effect.The theoretical investigation includes an analysis of patenting behavior in a setting with vertically and horizontally differentiated products. Due to imperfect patent protection competitors of the patentee may enter the market for the innovative product despite a patent. An empirical investigation of the theoretical results with data from the 2005 Mannheim Innovation Panel in combination with patent information from the European Patent Office provides strong evidence for the main conclusions.

	Acknowledgements	8
	Contents	10
	List of Symbols	12
	Chapter 1 Introduction	15
	1.1 The Patent System	20
	1.1.1 Disclosure Requirement	24
	1.1.2 Research Exemption	26
	1.1.3 Patent Duration	27
	1.1.4 Patent Scope	27
	1.1.5 Inventive Step	28
	1.2 The Economic Analysis of the Propensity to Patent	31
	1.2.1 The Decision to Patent in the Light of the Protective Effect	32
	1.2.2 The Decision to Patent in the Light of the Disclosure Effect	34
	1.3 A New Theoretical Approach to the Propensity to Patent	39
	1.4 Empirical Insights on the Propensity to Patent	43
	1.5 Outline of the Book	48
	Chapter 2 The Decision to Patent with Vertical Product Differentiation	50
	2.1 The Model Setup	51
	2.2 Price Competition	53
	2.3 Quality Choices	55
	2.3.1 Quality Choices if the Invention is Kept Secret	58
	2.3.2 Quality Choices if the Invention is Patented	63
	2.4 The Patenting Decision	66
	2.5 Licensing	70
	2.6 Welfare Considerations	76
	2.6.1 Welfare with Secrecy	77
	2.6.2 Welfare with a Patent	77
	2.6.3 Welfare with Licensing	78
	2.6.4 Welfare Maximizing Appropriation Choice	78
	2.7 Concluding Remarks	80
	Chapter 3 An Empirical Investigation of the Decision to Patent with Vertical Product Differentiation	83
	3.1 Hypotheses and Their Empirical Implementation	83
	3.2 Sample Definition	86
	3.3 Variable Definition	88
	3.4 Empirical Results	92
	3.5 Concluding Remarks	97
	Chapter 4 The Decision to Patent with Horizontal Product Differentiation	99
	4.1 The Model Setup	101
	4.2 Price Competition	103
	4.3 Market Entry	109
	4.4 The Patenting Decision	114
	4.5 Licensing	121
	4.6 Welfare Considerations	124
	4.6.1 Welfare with Secrecy	124
	4.6.2 Welfare with a Patent	125
	4.6.3 Welfare with Licensing	129
	4.6.4 Welfare Maximizing Appropriation Choice	129
	4.7 Concluding Remarks	132
	Chapter 5 An Empirical Investigation of the Decision to Patent with Horizontal Product Differentiation	135
	5.1 Hypotheses and Their Empirical Implementation	135
	5.2 Sample and Variable Definition	138
	5.3 Empirical Results	139
	5.4 Concluding Remarks	142
	Chapter 6 Summary and Discussion	144
	Appendix A Proofs of Propositions, Lemmata andCorollaries in Chapter 2	154
	Appendix B Definition of Industry Dummies	160
	Appendix C Proofs of Propositions and Lemmata inChapter 4	161
	References	168