| Contents | 5 |
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| List of Figures | 7 |
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| List of Tables | 8 |
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| Abbreviations and Acronyms | 9 |
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| Introduction | 11 |
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| The Challenge: A Transnational Response to HIV/ AIDS | 15 |
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| 2.1 The Epidemiology of HIV | 16 |
| 2.1.1 A Typology for Classifying AIDS Epidemics | 17 |
| 2.1.2 HIV/AIDS in High-Income Countries | 19 |
| 2.1.3 HIV/AIDS in Low and Middle-Income Countries | 19 |
| 2.2 National and Transnational Impacts of AIDS | 22 |
| 2.2.1 Demographic Impacts of AIDS | 23 |
| 2.2.2 The Burden of AIDS | 26 |
| 2.2.3 Biological Spillovers of AIDS | 28 |
| 2.2.4 Transnational Impacts of AIDS | 31 |
| 2.3 Responding to AIDS | 33 |
| 2.3.1 The Prevention, Treatment and Care Continuum | 33 |
| 2.3.2 The Conceptual Background of International Health- Promoting Public Goods | 37 |
| 2.3.3 Definitions | 38 |
| 2.3.4 The Concept of Aggregation Technology | 39 |
| 2.4 Conclusions | 42 |
| Profiling the Provision Status of Health- Promoting Public Goods Against AIDS | 44 |
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| 3.1 Key Health-Promoting Public Goods | 46 |
| 3.2 The Benchmark Case | 49 |
| 3.3 Efficient and Equilibrium Allocations: The Weakest- Link Case | 53 |
| 3.3.1 First-Order Condition if i is the Weakest- Link Country | 55 |
| 3.3.2 First-Order Condition for all Other Countries j | 55 |
| 3.4 Efficient and Equilibrium Allocations: The Best-Shot Case | 60 |
| 3.4.1 Applying Hirshleifer’s Analysis to the Case “ Developing a Vaccine” | 61 |
| 3.4.2 An Extension of Hirshleifer’s Analysis | 64 |
| 3.5 Conclusions | 67 |
| International Transfers | 70 |
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| 4.1 Unconditional Income Transfers | 72 |
| 4.1.1 The Basic Model | 73 |
| 4.1.2 Corner Solutions | 76 |
| 4.1.3 Cost Differentials | 79 |
| 4.1.4 Weakest-Link and Best-Shot Public Goods in the Case of International Assistance | 86 |
| 4.1.5 Non-neutrality of Unconditional Income Transfers | 94 |
| 4.1.6 Discussion and Policy Recommendations | 95 |
| 4.2 In-Kind Transfers | 98 |
| 4.2.1 Income or In-Kind Transfers in a Weakest-Link Case | 99 |
| 4.2.2 Income or In-Kind Transfers in a Best-Shot Case | 103 |
| 4.2.3 A Comparison of Income versus In-Kind Transfers | 107 |
| 4.2.4 Discussion: Transferring Income or Giving in Kind? | 108 |
| 4.3 Conditional Income Transfers | 111 |
| 4.3.1 Allocative Consequences of Subsidies in the Case of “ Knowledge About HIV” | 112 |
| 4.3.2 Allocative Consequences of Subsidies in the Case of Alternative Aggregation Technologies | 113 |
| 4.3.3 Limits of a Subsidy Mechanism | 115 |
| 4.3.4 An Alternative Subsidy Mechanism | 117 |
| 4.3.5 Discussion: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Subsidy Mechanism | 121 |
| 4.4 Conclusions | 121 |
| Regional Constraints and HIV/AIDS | 125 |
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| 5.1 The Impact of Regional Constraints on HIV/AIDS | 126 |
| 5.1.1 The Relationship Between Missing Access to Water, Sanitation and HIV/ AIDS | 126 |
| 5.1.2 The Relationship Between Malnutrition and HIV/AIDS | 128 |
| 5.1.3 Discussion: The Role of ODA | 129 |
| 5.2 Institutional Considerations | 131 |
| 5.3 Conclusions | 132 |
| Summary and Concluding Remarks | 134 |
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| Appendices | 138 |
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| Appendix A: Providing Unconditional Income Transfers in a Best- Shot Case | 138 |
| Appendix B: Necessary Feasibility Constraint in a Weakest- Link Case | 139 |
| Appendix C: Necessary Feasibility Constraint in a Best-Shot Case | 140 |
| Appendix D: The Effects of a Subsidy in a Framework of Private Provided Public Goods | 140 |
| Appendix E: A Modified Samuelson Condition | 143 |
| References | 146 |
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| Index | 157 |