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Advances in Systems Safety Proceedings of the Nineteenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Southampton, UK, 8-10th February 2011

:	Chris Dale, Tom Anderson
:	Chris Dale, Tom Anderson
:	Advances in Systems Safety Proceedings of the Nineteenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Southampton, UK, 8-10th February 2011
:	Springer-Verlag
:	9780857291332
:	1
:	CHF 132.40
:

:	Informatik
:	English

:	309
:	Wasserzeichen/DRM
:	PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
:	PDF

Advances in Systems Safety contains the papers presented at the nineteenth annual Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, held at Southampton, UK, in February 2011.

The Symposium is for engineers, managers and academics in the field of system safety, across all industry sectors, so the papers making up this volume offer a wide-ranging coverage of current safety topics, and a blend of academic research and industrial experience. They include both recent developments in the field and discussion of open issues that will shape future progress.

The 17 papers in this volume are presented under the headings of the Symposium's sessions: Safety Cases; Projects, Services and Systems of Systems; Systems Safety in Healthcare; Testing Safety-Critical Systems; Technological Matters and Safety Standards.

The book will be of interest to both academics and practitioners working in the safety-critical systems arena.

	Preface	6
	A message from the sponsors	6
	THE SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS CLUB	7
	Safety-critical Systems Symposium	7
	What is the Safety-Critical Systems Club?	7
	Objectives	7
	History	7
	The Club’s activities	7
	Education and communication	8
	Influence on research	8
	Membership	8
	Contents	9
	Safety Cases	11
	A New Approach to creating Clear SafetyArguments	12
	1 Introduction	12
	2 The difficulties with a single argument	15
	3 Constructing assured safety arguments	15
	3.1 Asserted inference	18
	3.2 Asserted context	18
	3.3 Asserted solution	21
	3.4 Confidence argument structure	22
	3.5 The overall confidence argument	26
	4 Example assured safety argument	27
	5 Conclusions	31
	Acknowledgments	32
	References	32
	Safety Cases – what can we learn from Science?	33
	1 Introduction	33
	2 How science works	34
	2.1 Some history	34
	2.2 Knowledge through science	35
	2.3 The practice of science	36
	3 Some comments on safety case fundamentals	37
	4 Safety cases from a scientific viewpoint	38
	4.1 Safety cases, hypotheses and challenges	39
	4.1.1 The safety case hypothesis	39
	4.1.2 Challenging the safety case hypothesis	39
	4.1.2.1 While the safety case is being developed	40
	4.1.2.2 Independent assessment of the completed safety case	40
	4.1.2.3 After the system has entered service	41
	4.2 ‘Normal science’ and paradigm shift	41
	4.3 Implications	42
	5 Compatibility with standards and regulatory requirements	44
	5.1 Def Stan 00-56 Issue 4	44
	5.2 IEC 61508	45
	5.3 CAP 670/SW01	46
	6 Conclusions	47
	References	48
	Accounting for Evidence: Managing Evidencefor Goal Based Software Safety Standards	49
	1 Introduction	49
	2 Managing the argument	50
	3 Managing the processes that create evidence	52
	4 Assessing the evidence	54
	4.1 Overall process of assessment	54
	4.2 Limitations, counter-evidence and assurance deficits	56
	4.3 Safety case evidence report	57
	5 Conclusion	58
	Acknowledgments	59
	References	59
	Projects, Services and Systems of Systems	60
	Distinguishing Fact from Fiction in a System ofSystems Safety Case	61
	1 Introduction	61
	2 Hazard assessment approach	63
	2.1 Feature modelling	66
	2.2 Configuration space structure	67
	2.3 Pre-deployment hazard assessment	68
	2.4 Post-deployment hazard assessment	69
	2.5 Safety case	70
	3 Analysis of the human element	72
	3.1 Towards human factors methods for SoS hazard identification	72
	3.2 Human factors differential analysis for IAT	73
	4 Validation	75
	5 Summary and future work	76
	References	77
	A Project Manager’s View of Safety-CriticalSystems	79
	1 Introduction	79
	2 The commercial reality	80
	3 Doing what has to be done	82
	4 Requirements, acceptance criteria and constraints	84
	5 Testing in a smart way	87
	5.1 Did we test the product in the right way?	87
	5.2 Did we introduce other defects that were not found?	89
	6 Project management of product defects	89
	6.1 The fundamental question	90
	6.2 Relating cost of failure to cost of testing	91
	6.3 Benefit, cost and risk	92
	6.4 Design for testing	92
	7 Concluding remarks	93
	References	94
	System Safety in an IT Service Organization	95
	1 Introduction	95
	1.1 About Logica	95
	1.2 About Logica in the UK	96
	1.3 Logica services	96
	1.3.1 Safety-related services	96
	1.4 Service model description	97
	1.4.1 Service delivery lifecycle	97
	1.4.1.1 Bid	97
	1.4.1.2 Due diligence	98