| New Developments in the Theory of Networks | 3 |
|---|
| Contents | 5 |
| Contributors | 9 |
| New Developments in the Theory of Networks: Introduction | 13 |
| 1 Franchising | 14 |
| 1.1 Contract Design and Decision Rights | 14 |
| 1.2 Incentives and Ownership Strategy | 15 |
| 1.3 Strategy, Competition and Internationalization of Franchise Firms | 15 |
| 1.4 Entrepreneurship and Franchising | 16 |
| 1.5 Franchising and Regulation | 17 |
| 2 Alliances | 17 |
| 2.1 Value Creation in Network Relationships | 17 |
| 2.2 Organization of Innovation Through Alliances | 18 |
| 2.3 Knowledge Management in Networks | 19 |
| 3 Cooperatives | 19 |
| 3.1 Behavioral Logics and Governance of Cooperatives | 19 |
| References | 20 |
| Part A: Franchising | 22 |
| Contract Design and Decision Rights | 22 |
| Incentives and Ownership Strategy | 22 |
| Strategy, Competition and Internationalization of Franchise Firms | 22 |
| Entrepreneurship and Franchising | 23 |
| Franchising and Regulation | 23 |
| Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising | 24 |
| 1 Introduction | 14 |
| 2 Contractual Completeness | 14 |
| 2.1 Contractual Completeness and Decision Rights | 15 |
| 2.2 Relationship Between Completeness and Complexity | 15 |
| 3 Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising | 16 |
| 3.1 Transaction Cost Theory | 17 |
| 3.1.1 Environmental Uncertainty | 17 |
| 3.1.2 Transaction-Specific Investments | 17 |
| 3.2 Agency Theory | 18 |
| 3.3 Property Rights Theory | 19 |
| 3.4 The Relational View of Governance | 19 |
| 3.5 Organizational Capability View | 19 |
| 4 Empirical Analysis | 30 |
| 4.1 Sample and Data Collection | 30 |
| 4.2 Measurement | 31 |
| 4.3 Results | 33 |
| 4.4 Discussion and Conclusion | 35 |
| Appendix: Measures of Variables | 37 |
| References | 20 |
| Delegation and Autonomy in Franchising | 42 |
| 1 Introduction | 42 |
| 2 Control Versus Autonomy in Franchise Relationships | 43 |
| 2.1 Autonomy and Free-Riding Hazards | 44 |
| 2.2 Relational Governance and Autonomy | 45 |
| 2.3 Knowledge Assets and Autonomy | 46 |
| 3 Data and Procedures | 47 |
| 3.1 Dependent Variable | 48 |
| 3.2 Independent Variables | 48 |
| 4 Methods and Results | 49 |
| 5 Conclusions | 53 |
| References | 54 |
| Allocation of Decision Rights in International Franchise Firms: The Case of Master and Direct Franchising | 56 |
| 1 Introduction | 56 |
| 2 Organization of International Franchise Firms | 58 |
| 2.1 Decision Rights | 58 |
| 3 Theoretical Views on the Allocation of Decision Rights | 60 |
| 3.1 Property Rights Theory and Allocation of Decision Rights | 60 |
| 3.2 Agency Theory and Allocation of Decision Rights | 61 |
| 3.3 Transaction Cost Theory and Allocation of Decision Rights | 64 |
| 4 Conclusion | 66 |
| References | 66 |
| Incentives and Control in Company-Owned Versus Franchised Outlets: An Empirical Study at the Chain Level | 70 |
| 1 Introduction | 70 |
| 2 The Efficiency of the Plural Form | 72 |
| 2.1 Franchised Units: An Efficient Form? | 72 |
| 2.2 Company-Owned Units: The Efficiency of a Hierarchical Form | 73 |
| 2.3 The Strange Form: Multi-Unit Franchises | 74 |
| 3 The Net Case Study | 74 |
| 3.1 NET: A Plural Form in a Reform Context | 75 |
| 3.2 Net: A Contrasted Plural Form | 76 |
| 4 Econometric Analysis | 79 |
| 4.1 Explained Variables | 79 |
| 4.2 Explanatory Variables | 80 |
| 4.2.1 Organizational Choices | 80 |
| 4.2.2 Unit´s Characteristics | 80 |
| 4.3 Organizational Choices and Performances: Econometric Results | 80 |
| 5 Conclusion | 83 |
| References | 84 |
| Plural Form and Franchisor Performance: Early Empirical Findings from Europe | 86 |
| 1 Introduction | 86 |
| 2 Literature Review | 88 |
| 2.1 Plural Form | 88 |
| 2.2 Agency Theory | 89 |
| 2.3 Resource Scarcity Theory | 89 |
| 2.4 Risk-Based Explanation of Plural Form | 90 |
| 2.5 A Critical´´ Asset View of Plural Form | 90 |
| 3 Hypotheses | 92 |
| 3.1 Plural Form and Critical Assets | 92 |
| 3.2 Plural Form and Life Cycle Stage | 92 |
| 4 Method | 93 |
| 4.1 Data | 93 |
| 4.2 Measurement Scales | 94 |
| 5 Results | 97 |
| 6 Discussion and Conclusion | 99 |
| 6.1 Theoretical Contributions | 100 |
| 6.2 Managerial Implications | 100 |
| 6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research | 101 |
| References | 102 |
| Inner Strength Against Competitive Forces: Successful Site Selection for Franchise Network Expansion | 104 |
| 1 Introduction | 104 |
| 2 Theoretical Framework | 106 |
| 3 Hypotheses | 110 |
| 3.1 Market Perspective Criteria | 110 |
| 3.2 Inner Strength Perspective Criteria | 110 |
| 4 Data, Methods and Variables | 114 |
| 4.1 Sample | 114 |
| 4.2 Variables | 114 |
| 4.2.1 Dependent Variables | 114 |
| 4.2.2 Independent and Control Variables | 115 |
| 4.3 Methods | 117 |
| 5 Results | 118 |
| 6 Discussion | 121 |
| References | 123 |
| Market Saturation or Market Concentration: Evidence on Competition Among U.S. Limited Service Franchise Brands | 128 |
| 1 Introduction | 128 |
| 2 Res
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