: Gérard Cliquet, Josef Windsperger, Mika Tuunanen, George Hendrikse
: Mika Tuunanen, Josef Windsperger, Gérard Cliquet, George Hendrikse
: New Developments in the Theory of Networks Franchising, Alliances and Cooperatives
: Physica-Verlag
: 9783790826159
: 1
: CHF 85.30
:
: Management
: English
: 372
: Wasserzeichen
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
The theory of networks aims at developing theoretical views on the design and management of alliances, franchise chains, licensing, joint ventures, cooperatives, and venture capital relations. The current trend in economics and management of networks is twofold: First there is a strong tendency toward application of theoretical approaches developed both in organizational economics, strategic management and organization theory. The second trend refers to the development of more integrative views on networks. Especially, combining organizational economics, strategic management and relational views on networks are very promising research directions. Starting from this status of research, the current book emphasizes network research as a theory-driven field by offering new perspectives on contract design, decision and ownership rights, value creation, knowledge management and the role of social capital in franchising networks, alliances and cooperatives.

Mika Tuunanen, Research focus: Franchising and Entrepreneurship, Professor at the School of Business and Economics, University of Jyväskylä, Finland Josef Windsperger, Research focus: Networks and Theory of the Firm, Professor of Organization and Management at the Center of Business Studies, University of Vienna, Austria Gerard Cliquet, Research focus: Marketing, Retailing and Franchising, Professor of Business at the IGR-IAE, Université de Rennes 1, France George Hendrikse, Research focus: Organization Economics, Cooperatives, Franchising, Professor at the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
New Developments in the Theory of Networks3
Contents5
Contributors9
New Developments in the Theory of Networks: Introduction13
1 Franchising14
1.1 Contract Design and Decision Rights14
1.2 Incentives and Ownership Strategy15
1.3 Strategy, Competition and Internationalization of Franchise Firms15
1.4 Entrepreneurship and Franchising16
1.5 Franchising and Regulation17
2 Alliances17
2.1 Value Creation in Network Relationships17
2.2 Organization of Innovation Through Alliances18
2.3 Knowledge Management in Networks19
3 Cooperatives19
3.1 Behavioral Logics and Governance of Cooperatives19
References20
Part A: Franchising22
Contract Design and Decision Rights22
Incentives and Ownership Strategy22
Strategy, Competition and Internationalization of Franchise Firms22
Entrepreneurship and Franchising23
Franchising and Regulation23
Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising24
1 Introduction14
2 Contractual Completeness14
2.1 Contractual Completeness and Decision Rights15
2.2 Relationship Between Completeness and Complexity15
3 Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising16
3.1 Transaction Cost Theory17
3.1.1 Environmental Uncertainty17
3.1.2 Transaction-Specific Investments17
3.2 Agency Theory18
3.3 Property Rights Theory19
3.4 The Relational View of Governance19
3.5 Organizational Capability View19
4 Empirical Analysis30
4.1 Sample and Data Collection30
4.2 Measurement31
4.3 Results33
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion35
Appendix: Measures of Variables37
References20
Delegation and Autonomy in Franchising42
1 Introduction42
2 Control Versus Autonomy in Franchise Relationships43
2.1 Autonomy and Free-Riding Hazards44
2.2 Relational Governance and Autonomy45
2.3 Knowledge Assets and Autonomy46
3 Data and Procedures47
3.1 Dependent Variable48
3.2 Independent Variables48
4 Methods and Results49
5 Conclusions53
References54
Allocation of Decision Rights in International Franchise Firms: The Case of Master and Direct Franchising56
1 Introduction56
2 Organization of International Franchise Firms58
2.1 Decision Rights58
3 Theoretical Views on the Allocation of Decision Rights60
3.1 Property Rights Theory and Allocation of Decision Rights60
3.2 Agency Theory and Allocation of Decision Rights61
3.3 Transaction Cost Theory and Allocation of Decision Rights64
4 Conclusion66
References66
Incentives and Control in Company-Owned Versus Franchised Outlets: An Empirical Study at the Chain Level70
1 Introduction70
2 The Efficiency of the Plural Form72
2.1 Franchised Units: An Efficient Form?72
2.2 Company-Owned Units: The Efficiency of a Hierarchical Form73
2.3 The Strange Form: Multi-Unit Franchises74
3 The Net Case Study74
3.1 NET: A Plural Form in a Reform Context75
3.2 Net: A Contrasted Plural Form76
4 Econometric Analysis79
4.1 Explained Variables79
4.2 Explanatory Variables80
4.2.1 Organizational Choices80
4.2.2 Unit´s Characteristics80
4.3 Organizational Choices and Performances: Econometric Results80
5 Conclusion83
References84
Plural Form and Franchisor Performance: Early Empirical Findings from Europe86
1 Introduction86
2 Literature Review88
2.1 Plural Form88
2.2 Agency Theory89
2.3 Resource Scarcity Theory89
2.4 Risk-Based Explanation of Plural Form90
2.5 A Critical´´ Asset View of Plural Form90
3 Hypotheses92
3.1 Plural Form and Critical Assets92
3.2 Plural Form and Life Cycle Stage92
4 Method93
4.1 Data93
4.2 Measurement Scales94
5 Results97
6 Discussion and Conclusion99
6.1 Theoretical Contributions100
6.2 Managerial Implications100
6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research101
References102
Inner Strength Against Competitive Forces: Successful Site Selection for Franchise Network Expansion104
1 Introduction104
2 Theoretical Framework106
3 Hypotheses110
3.1 Market Perspective Criteria110
3.2 Inner Strength Perspective Criteria110
4 Data, Methods and Variables114
4.1 Sample114
4.2 Variables114
4.2.1 Dependent Variables114
4.2.2 Independent and Control Variables115
4.3 Methods117
5 Results118
6 Discussion121
References123
Market Saturation or Market Concentration: Evidence on Competition Among U.S. Limited Service Franchise Brands128
1 Introduction128
2 Res