| About the Translators | 8 |
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| Comments On The Translation | 10 |
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| Translators´ Commentary | 12 |
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| Contents | 14 |
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| Chapter 1: Stating the Economic Problem and Basic Principles | 16 |
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| § 1. Stating the Economic Problem | 16 |
| § 2. Systems of Market Structures | 17 |
| § 3. Elements of the Economic Model | 18 |
| § 4. Basic Principles of the Free Market Capitalist Economy | 20 |
| § 5. The Classical General Equilibrium Model | 20 |
| § 6. The General Notion of Individual Equilibrium in a Market | 23 |
| Chapter 2: General Analysis of Typical Market Structures | 26 |
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| § 1. Methods | 26 |
| § 2. Classical Equilibrium by Free Competition | 27 |
| § 3. Monopsony and Monopoly | 28 |
| § 4. Oligopolistic Supply and Demand | 30 |
| § 5. Bilateral Monopoly | 37 |
| § 6. Bilateral Oligopoly, Reduced Monopsony, Reduced Monopoly | 40 |
| Chapter 3: Analysis of the Relationship Between Dual Markets and Multiple Markets | 42 |
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| § 1. System of Relationships Between Two Markets | 42 |
| § 2. Two Monopsonies with Tied Supply (Type I) | 45 |
| § 3. Two Monopolies with Tied Demand (Type II) | 49 |
| § 4. The Intermediary Bilateral Monopoly (Type III) | 51 |
| § 5. Market Equilibrium and Equilibrium | 52 |
| Chapter 4: Dyopolistic Market Share Ranking | 55 |
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| § 1. General Analysis | 55 |
| § 2. The Simple Dyopoly | 62 |
| I. The Demand Dyopoly | 62 |
| II. The Supply Dyopoly | 62 |
| § 3. The Supply Relationship Between Two Monopsonies | 63 |
| I. Alternative Products | 63 |
| II. Complementary Products | 65 |
| § 4. The Demand Relationship Between Two Monopolies | 67 |
| I. Rival Goods | 67 |
| II. Complementary Goods | 68 |
| § 5. The Intermediary Bilateral Monopoly | 68 |
| § 6. A Numerical Example | 69 |
| Chapter 5: Landmark History of Economic Thought | 75 |
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| § 1. First Attempt to Solve the Problem of Dyopoly | 75 |
| I. August Cournot 1838 | 75 |
| II. Joseph Bertrand 1883 | 76 |
| III. Francis Isidro Edgeworth 1897 | 78 |
| IV. Vilfredo Pareto 1909 | 80 |
| § 2. Development of Dyopoly Theory | 82 |
| I. The Bertrand-Edgeworth School | 82 |
| II. The Lausanne School | 83 |
| III. The Rebirth of Cournot´s Theory | 84 |
| IV. The Term, ``The Position of Independence´´ | 87 |
| V. The Eclectic School | 89 |
| § 3. Overview of the Development of Bilateral Monopoly Theory | 94 |
| Chapter 6: Market Structure and Economic Policy | 98 |
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| § 1. The Significance of the Unstable Market in the Real Economy | 98 |
| § 2. Safeguarding the Equilibrium as a Function of Economic Policy | 101 |
| § 3. The Theoretical Model of Fascist Corporative Markets | 105 |
| Mathematical Appendix | 108 |
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| I. The General Structure of the Individual Equilibrium in a Market. (First chap., § 6.) | 108 |
| II. The Classical General Equilibrium in a Market with Free Competition. (Second Chap., § 2.) | 110 |
| III. The Monopoly. (Second Chap., § 3.) | 113 |
| IV. The Oligopoly. (Second Chap., § 4.) | 114 |
| V. The Bilateral Monopoly. (Second Chap., § 5.) | 117 |
| VI. Preliminary Remarks for the Third Chapter. | 121 |
| VII. Two Monopsonies with Tied Supply. (Third Chap., § 2.) | 124 |
| VIII. The Intermediary Bilateral Monopoly. (Third Chap., § 4.) | 129 |
| IX. The Dyopoly. (Numerical Example.) | 131 |
| X. The Demand Relationship Between Monopolies. (Algebraic Example) | 135 |
| XI. Additional Item. | 142 |
| R.F. Harrod´s attempt at a solution | 142 |
| Index | 146 |
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