: Marie Du#í, Bjorn Jespersen, Pavel Materna
: Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic
: Springer-Verlag
: 9789048188123
: 1
: CHF 189.80
:
: Allgemeines, Lexika
: English
: 550
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF

The book is about logical analysis of natural language. Since we humans communicate by means of natural language, we need a tool that helps us to understand in a precise manner how the logical and formal mechanisms of natural language work. Moreover, in the age of computers, we need to communicate both with and through computers as well. Transparent Intensional Logic is a tool that is helpful in making our communication and reasoning smooth and precise. It deals with all kinds of linguistic context in a fully compositional and anti-contextual way.



Doc. RNDr. Marie Du í, CSc., is Associate Professor at VSB-Technical University Ostrava, Czech Republic. Her research interests include philosophical and mathematical logic, conceptual modelling, computer science (theory of information). In 2001 she was one of the invited lecturers in a seminar on Transparent Intensional Logic, University of Leiden, the Netherlands. In 2008 the Rector of VSB-Technical University Ostrava awarded her for the greatest contribution to the scientific and research progress of the entire university.

Dr Bjørn Jespersen, PhD., is currently Visiting Researcher at the Section of Philosophy, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology. Since the late 1990s Jespersen published forty research papers, frequently co-authored with Marie Du í or Pavel Materna, on Transparent Intensional Logic, as well as covering other issues in natural-language semantics, epistemology, and epistemic logic. He co-edited, together with V. Svoboda and C. Cheyne, the 900-page collection of Tichý's collected papers, published in 2004.

PhDr. Pavel Materna, CSc, is Professor of Logic at Masaryk University (Brno), and senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Prague). Materna is a member of the editorial board of the philosophical journals Filosofický casopis (Philosophical journal) and Organon F, member of the Internationale Bernard-Bolzano Gesellschaft, Salzburg, Austria, and Chairman of the National Committee for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.
Preface7
Acknowledgments9
Contents11
1 A programme of general semantics14
1.1 The programme in outline14
1.1.1 Semantic schemas28
1.2 The top-down vs. bottom-up approach to logical semantics36
1.2.1 The bottom-up approach36
1.2.2 The top-down approach48
1.3 Foundations of TIL50
1.3.1 Functional approach50
1.3.2 Constructions and types55
1.4 Possible-world intensions vs. extensions69
1.4.1 Epistemic framework69
1.4.2 Intensions and extensions74
1.4.2.1 Classification of empirical properties77
1.4.2.2 The part-whole relation85
1.4.2.3 The top-down approach to semantics revisited90
1.4.3 Logical objects97
1.5 Constructions as structured meanings108
1.5.1 Structured meanings108
1.5.1.1 Analytic vs. logical116
1.5.2 Supposition de dicto and de re vs. reference shift123
1.5.2.1 Two principles de re131
1.5.2.2 Interplay between de dicto and de re138
1.5.3 Important entities and notational conventions: summary144
2 Foundations of semantic analysis146
2.1 A logical method of semantic analysis146
2.1.1 The Parmenides principle146
2.1.2 The compositionality constraint150
2.1.3 Better and worse analyses154
2.2 Concepts as procedural meanings161
2.2.1 Concepts and synonymy161
2.2.2 Concepts and definitions176
2.2.2.1 Ontological definition176
2.2.2.2 Equational verbal definition177
2.2.3 Conceptual system179
2.3 Empirical and mathematical existence183
2.3.1 Existence and extensions184
2.3.2 Existence and intensions187
2.4 Explicit intensionalization and temporalization191
2.4.1 Anti-actualism191
2.4.2 Predication as functional application203
2.4.3 Montague s implicit intensionalization213
2.5 Modal and temporal interplay218
2.5.1 Supposition de dicto with respect to temporal parameters220
2.5.2 Tenses and truth-conditions225
2.5.2.1 Simple past228
2.5.2.2 Present perfect234
2.5.2.3 Temporal de dicto vs. de re236
2.5.2.4 Future tenses239
2.6 Three kinds of context241
2.6.1 Using and mentioning constructions247
2.6.2 Intensional and extensional occurrence of constituents256
2.7 TIL as a hyperintensional, partial, typed lambda-calculus273
2.7.1 Substitution and Leibniz s Law285
3 Singular reference and pragmaticallyincomplete meaning292
3.1 Definite descriptions292
3.2 Proper names297
3.2.1 Mathematical constants301
3.3 Identities involving descriptions and names309
3.3.1 Hesperus is Phosphorus: co-occupation of individual offices314
3.4 Pragmatically incomplete meanings324
3.4.1 Indexicals327
3.4.2 Indefinite descriptions332
3.5 Anaphora and meaning336
3.5.1 Semantic pre-processing of anaphora338
3.5.2 Donkey sentences349
3.5.3 Dynamic discourse359
3.6 Questions and answers364
4 Requisites: the logic of intensions372
4.1 Requisites defined373
4.2 Intensional essentialism380
4.2.1 Quine s mathematical cyclist397
4.3 Requisites and substitution in simple sentences398
4.4 Property modification and pseudo-detachment408
4.4.1 Malfunction: subsective vs. privative modification419
4.5 Nomological necessity424
4.6 Counterfactuals427
5 Attitudes and information433
5.1 Propositional attitudes437
5.1.1 Three puzzles and a non-puzzle439
5.1.2 Propositional attitudes de dicto vs. de re445
5.1.2.1 Intensional propositional attitudes de dicto and de re448
5.1.2.2 Hyperintensional propositional attitudes de dicto and de re453
5.1.2.3 Summary of attitudes459
5.1.3 Inconsistent belief463
5.1.4 Knowing whether465
5.1.5 Epistemic closure and inferable knowledge470
5.1.6 Factivity and epistemic shift481
5.2 Notional attitudes483
5.2.1 Wishing and wanting to487
5.2.2 Seeking, finding and looking for497
5.3 Quantifying in507
5.4 Information and inference518
5.4.1 Empirical semantic information and the scandal ofdeduction 523
5.4.2 Empirical content of sentences527
5.4.3 Analytical content of sentences528
5.4.4 Information content of analytically equivalent sentences533
5.4.5 The information value of a valid argument539
5.4.5.1 The paradox of inference539
Bibliography541
Name Index552
Subject Index555