| Preface | 6 |
|---|
| Contents | 7 |
|---|
| Aspects of Insider Threats | 12 |
|---|
| 1 Introduction | 12 |
| 2 Insiders and Insider Threats | 13 |
| 2.1 Insider Threats | 16 |
| 2.2 Taxonomies | 17 |
| 3 Detection and Mitigation | 18 |
| 4 Policies | 20 |
| 5 Human Factors and Compliance | 22 |
| 6 Conclusion | 24 |
| References | 26 |
| Combatting Insider Threats | 27 |
|---|
| 1 A Contextual View of Insiders and Insider Threats | 27 |
| 2 Risks of Insider Misuse | 30 |
| 2.1 Types of Insiders | 30 |
| 2.2 Types of Insider Misuse | 31 |
| 3 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Risks | 32 |
| 3.1 Relevant Knowledge and Experience | 33 |
| 3.2 Exploitations of Vulnerabilities | 34 |
| 3.3 Potential Risks Resulting from Exploitations | 35 |
| 4 Countermeasures | 35 |
| 4.1 Specification of Sound Policies for Data Gathering and Monitoring | 37 |
| 4.2 Detection, Analysis, and Identification of Misuse | 38 |
| 4.3 Desired Responses to Detected Anomalies and Misuses | 39 |
| 5 Decomposition of Insider Misuse Problems | 39 |
| 5.1 Stages of Development and Use | 40 |
| 5.2 Extended Profiling Including Psychological and Other Factors | 41 |
| 6 Requirements for Insider-Threat-Resistant High-Integrity Elections | 43 |
| 7 Relevance of the Countermeasures to Elections | 46 |
| 8 Research and Development Needs | 49 |
| 9 Conclusions | 50 |
| References | 51 |
| Insider Threat and Information Security Management | 55 |
|---|
| 1 Introduction | 55 |
| 2 Definitions of Insider and the Relevance to Information Security Management | 56 |
| 3 Risk and Insiderness | 59 |
| 3.1 The Importance of Organisational Culture and the Significance of Cultural Risks | 61 |
| 3.2 Fieldwork on Culture and the Insider Threat | 61 |
| 4 The Structure of the ISMS and Traditional Information Security Management Responses to Insiderness | 63 |
| 4.1 Analysis Turning an ISMS Inwards | 64 |
| 4.2 The Role of Operationalisation | 65 |
| 5 Information Security Management Standards, Best Practice and the Insider Threat | 66 |
| 5.1 General Security Management Standards | 66 |
| 5.2 Guidelines Focused on the Management of the Insider Threat | 67 |
| 5.3 Analysis of the Contribution of Best Practice and Guidelines | 70 |
| 6 Crime theories and insider threat | 71 |
| 6.1 Existing Connections between Crime Theories and Information Security Management | 72 |
| 7 Implications of Crime Theories for ISMS Design | 73 |
| 7.1 Application of SCP to the ISO Control Domains | 74 |
| 7.2 Implications for ISMS Process Design | 76 |
| 7.3 Summary of Crime Theory Contribution | 78 |
| 8 Conclusions | 79 |
| References | 80 |
| A State of the Art Survey of Fraud Detection Technology | 82 |
|---|
| 1 Introduction | 82 |
| 1.1 Data Analysis Methodology | 83 |
| 1.1.1 General | 83 |
| 1.1.2 Procedure | 84 |
| 2 Survey of Technology for Fraud Detection in Practice | 85 |
| 2.1 General Approaches for Intrusion and Fraud Detection | 85 |
| 2.2 State of the Art of Fraud Detection Tools and Techniques | 87 |
| 3 Why Fraud Detection is not the Same as Intrusion Detection | 89 |
| 4 Challenges for Fraud Detection in Information Systems | 91 |
| 5 Summary | 91 |
| Acknowledgements | 92 |
| References | 93 |
| Combining Traditional Cyber Security Audit Data with Psychosocial Data: Towards Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigatio | 94 |
|---|
| 1 Introduction | 94 |
| 2 Background | 97 |
| 3 Issues of Security and Privacy | 100 |
| 4 Predictive Modeling Approach | 103 |
| 5 Training Needs | 115 |
| 6 Conclusions and Research Challenges | 118 |
| 7 Acknowledgments | 120 |
| References | 120 |
| A Risk Management Approach to the “Insider Threat” | 123 |
|---|
| 1 Introduction | 124 |
| 2 Insider Threat Assessment | 125 |
| 2.1 Example | 128 |
| 2.2 Summary | 130 |
| 3 Access-Based Assessment | 130 |
| 4 Psychological Indicator-Based Assessment | 134 |
| 5 Application of Risk to System Countermeasures | 138 |
| 5.1 Example | 141 |
| 5.2 Summary | 143 |
| 6 Conclusion | 143 |
| References | 143 |
| Legally Sustainable Solutions for Privacy Issues in Collaborative Fraud Detection | 146 |
|---|
| 1 Introduction | 146 |
| 2 Monitoring Modern Distributed Systems | 147 |
| 2.1 Evidence Model | 149 |
| 3 Observing Fraudulent Service Behaviours | 152 |
| 3.1 Architectural Support | 155 |
| 4 Introduction to the Legal Perspective | 156 |
| 5 Basic Principles of Data Privacy Law | 157 |
| 5.1 A Set of Six Basic Rules | 158 |
| 5.1.1 Data Avoidance | 158 |
| 5.1.2 Transparency | 159 |
| 5.1.3 Purpose Specification and Binding | 159 |
| 5.1.4 ProhibitionWithout Explicit Permission | 159 |
| 5.1.5 Data Quality | 160 |
| 5.1.6 Data Security | 160 |
| 6 General Legal Requirements of Fraud Detection Systems | 160 |
| 6.1 Privacy Relevance of Fraud Detection Systems | 161 |
| 6.2 Necessary Data for Fraud Detection | 161 |
| 6.3 Transparency in the Fraud Detection Context | 162 |
| 6.4 Purpose Specification and Binding in Fraud Detection | 162 |
| 6.5 Permissibility of Fraud Detection | 162 |
| 6.6 Quality of Event Data | 163 |
| 6.7 Security of Event Data | 163 |
| 7 Technical Solutions for Privacy-respecting Fraud Detection | 163 |
| 7.1 Technical Requirements | 164 |
| 7.1.1 Requirements for Open Data | 166 |
| 7.1.2 Specific Requirements for Pseudonyms in Open Data | 166 |
| 7.1.3 Specific R
|