: John R. Miron
: The Geography of Competition Firms, Prices, and Localization
: Springer-Verlag
: 9781441956262
: 1
: CHF 133.60
:
: Volkswirtschaft
: English
: 456
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF

This book provides a comprehensive, up-to-date, and expert synthesis of location theory. What are the impacts of a firm's geographic location on the locations of customers, suppliers, and competitors in a market economy? How, when, and why does this result in the clustering of firms in space? When and how is society made better or worse off as a result? This book uses dozens of locational models to address aspects of these three questions. Classical location problems considered include Greenhut-Manne, Hitchcock-Koopmans, and Weber-Launhardt. The book reinterprets competitive location theory, focusing on the linkages between Walrasian price equilibrium and the localization of firms. It also demonstrates that competitive location theory offers diverse ideas about the nature of market equilibrium in geographic space and its implications for a broad range of public policies, including free trade, industrial policy, regional development, and investment in infrastructure. With an extensive bibliography and fresh, interdisciplinary approach, the book will be an invaluable reference for academics and researchers with an interest in regional science, economic geography, and urban planning, as well as policy advisors, urban planners, and consultants.

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Preface8
Acknowledgments20
Contents22
1 The Craft of the Story Teller26
1.1 Introduction26
1.2 Geographic and Other Perspectives on Localization28
1.3 Marshalls Perspective as a Starting Point33
1.4 The Development of Economics Since Marshall35
1.5 Why Is Competitive Location Theory Problematic?43
1.6 Location Theory and Geography45
1.7 My Approach47
1.8 What This Book Is About49
1.9 What This Book Is Not About51
2 The Firm at Home and Abroad54
2.1 The GreenhutManne Problem54
2.2 Model 2A: Non-spatial Monopolist55
2.3 Model 2B: Monopolist Selling at Two Places Factory at Place 1 Only
2.4 One Market or Two?75
2.5 Pricing Strategies77
2.6 Model 2C: Factory at Each Place78
2.7 Model 2D: Choice of Sites and Localization80
2.8 Two Markets Identical82
2.9 Differing Markets84
2.10 Comparative Statics in Model 2D86
2.11 Risk Aversion and Multiple Plants87
2.12 Model 2E: Contestability and Preemption of Competitors87
2.13 Final Comments90
3 Logistics and Programming93
3.1 The HitchcockKoopmans Problem93
3.2 An Illustrative Example99
3.3 Model 3A: Non-spatial Version of the Model100
3.4 The Example in a Non-spatial Version102
3.5 Model 3B: Spatial Version of the Model105
3.6 The Example: A Spatial Version111
3.7 What Is a Market?116
3.8 Final Comments117
4 The Struggling Masses120
4.1 The CournotSamuelsonEnke Problem120
4.2 Model 4A: Autarky123
4.3 Model 4B: Integrated Market Solution: Zero Shipping Cost130
4.4 Model 4C: Spatial Price Equilibrium with Shipping Costs136
4.5 Final Comments145
5 Arbitrage in the Grand Scheme148
5.1 The SamuelsonTakayamaJudge Problem148
5.2 Model 5A151
5.3 Social Welfare at Place i 155
5.4 Net Social Payoff and Global Net Social Welfare157
5.5 A Special Case: Horizontal Supply Curve at Each Place160
5.6 Three Examples of Multiregional Shipment161
5.7 Application165
5.8 Case Study167
5.9 Final Comments170
6 Ferrying Inputs and Outputs173
6.1 The WeberLaunhardt Problem173
6.2 Model 6A: I = 2 Input Places, J = 1 Output Place Location on a Line
6.3 Model 6B: I = 2 Input Places, J = 1 Output Place: Location on a Two-Dimensional Plane181
6.4 Model 6C: Substitutability, Scale, and Location187
6.5 Model 6D: Price Elasticity192
6.6 Model 6E: More Than 2 Input Places and/or More Than 1 Output Place193
6.7 Model 6F: Location on a Transportation Network194
6.8 Final Comments197
7 What the Firm Does On-Site199
7.1 The MarshallLentnekMacPhersonPhillips Problem199
7.2 Inventory Models in Management203
7.3 Model 7A: The Firm Doing Repairs In-House205
7.4 Model 7B: Outsourced Repairs210
7.5 Model 7C: The Decision to Outsource213
7.6 Model 7D: The Advantage of Agglomeration215
7.7 How Far Away Can the Contractor Be?219
7.8 Final Comments219
8 Staking Out the Firms Market222
8.1 The Market Area Problem222
8.2 Range and Geographic Size of Market226
8.3 Trade Area and Market Area in Retailing232
8.4 Model 8A: Two Firms Selling Commodity at Same f.o.b. Price233
8.5 Model 8B: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms Selling Same Commodity at Different f.o.b. Prices236
8.6 Model 8C: Why Do Prices Differ Among Firms?238
8.7 Model 8D: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms with Different Capacities241
8.8 Model 8E: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms with Different, but Perfectly Substitutable, Commodities242
8.9 Model 8F: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms with Different, but Perfectly Substitutable, Commodities When Customers Are of Two Types243
8.10 Model 8G: Market Area Boundary Between Two Firms Supplying Different Commodities244
8.11 Model 8H: Destination Choice Under Uncertainty247
8.12 Final Comments248
9 The Cautious Farmer and the Local Market251