: Melinda A. Roberts, David T. Wasserman
: Melinda A. Roberts, David T. Wasserman
: Harming Future Persons Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem
: Springer-Verlag
: 9781402056970
: 1
: CHF 133.00
:
: Allgemeines, Lexika
: English
: 335
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether-that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be 'fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth' 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons-persons who don't yet but will exist-in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful-not worth having-can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.
Acknowledgements6
Contents7
Contributors10
Harming Future Persons: Introduction12
1 Purpose of this Collection12
2 The Person-Affecting Intuition and the Nonidentity Problem13
3 The Nonidentity Cases14
4 Three Strategies for Addressing the Nonidentity Problem19
5 Contributions to this Collection22
6 Conclusion34
Notes34
References36
Part I38
The Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem39
1.1 The Logical and Metaphysical Dimensions of the Problem39
1.2 Four Strategies for Responding to the Nonidentity Problem41
1.3 Numerical, Biographical and Autobiographical Identity53
1.4 Conclusion57
Notes57
References60
Part II62
Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives63
2.1 The Asymmetry, Common Sense Morality and Rights63
2.2 How the Doctrine of Negative Rights Explains the Asymmetry64
2.3 The Grounds and Groundlessness of Rights67
2.4 The Symmetry of Reasons of Beneficence71
Notes79
References81
Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist82
3.1 Introduction82
3.2 Definitions and Distinctions83
3.3 Reasons and Values Presupposed by the Asymmetry85
3.4 The Distinction Between Harming and Benefiting87
3.5 The Individual-Affecting Symmetry View91
3.6 The Antinatalist Symmetry View94
3.7 The Impersonal Symmetry View97
3.8 Conclusion99
Notes100
References101
Part III102
Who Cares About Identity?103
4.1 Introduction103
4.2 The Moral Insignificance of Transworld Identity106
4.3 The Prudential Insignificance of Transworld Identity112
4.4 Genes and Identity116
Notes120
References122
Do Future Persons Presently Have Alternate Possible Identities?125
5.1 The Erewhon Hypothesis125
5.2 Variations on a Theme by Parfit126
5.3 The No-Difference Thesis130
5.4 Identity-Determining Choices and Identity-Determining Characteristics131
5.5 Ambiguous “Identities”133
5.6 Vague “Identities”134
5.7 Alternative Conceptions of “Identity”136
5.8 Future Persons as Vague but Identifiable Objects of Present Obligations137
5.9 Parfit and “The Descriptive View”142
5.10 Return to Erewhon144
Notes145
References146
Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity147
6.1 Introduction147
6.2 Two Decisive Intuitions148
6.3 How Simple Consequentialism Fails151
6.4 Why Simple Consequentialism Fails154
6.5 Rule Consequentialism155
6.6 A Contingent Morality159
6.7 Rule Consequentialism and Moral Philosophy162
Notes164
References165
Part IV167
Harming as Causing Harm168
7.1 Introduction168
7.2 Harming as Causing Harm170
7.3 Solving the Non-identity Problem171
7.4 Harming and Benefiting Those Who Independently Exist176
7.5 Is Causing Harm Sufficient for Harming?179
7.6 Conclusion181
Notes182
References185
Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions186
8.1 Introduction186
8.2 How Bad Is It?188
8.3 The Philosophical Problem188
8.4 Preventing Births to Protect Children189
8.5 The Nonexistence Condition192
8.6 The Human Rights Approach197
8.7 The Non-Identity Problem198
8.8 Conclusion205
Notes205
References208
Other References209
Harming and Procreating210
9.1210
9.2212
9.3213
9.4215
9.5217
9.6221
9.7223
9.8225
9.9225
9.10226
Notes227
References230
The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem: When is One Act Better for a Person than Another?231
10.1 Parallel Problems231
10.2 A Person-Based Approach to Procreative Choice235
10.3 The Nonidentity Problem239
10.4 The Two-Envelope Problem247
10.5 Conclusion252
Notes253
References257
Part V259
Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-identity Problem260
11.1 The Liberal View of Reproduction260
11.2 Reproduction and Non-identity