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Hop Integrity in the Internet

:	Chin-Tser Huang, Mohamed G. Gouda
:	Hop Integrity in the Internet
:	Springer-Verlag
:	9780387294445
:	1
:	CHF 85.30
:

:	Informatik
:	English

:	121
:	Wasserzeichen/DRM
:	PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
:	PDF

Denial-of-ser ice attacks are one of the most severe challenges confronting the online world. This ground-breaking volume discusses a new method of countering denial-of-service attacks called hop integrity. It details a suite of protocols for providing hop integrity. In particular, each protocol in this suite is specified and verified using an abstract and formal notation, called the Secure Protocol Notation. In addition, the book presents an alternative way to achieve strong hop integrity with hard sequence numbers.

Chapter 6 WEAK HOP INTEGRITY PROTOCOL (p. 55-56)

In this and the next two chapters, we present the hop integrity protocols. The hop integrity protocols belong to two thin layers, namely the secret exchange layer and the integrity check layer, that need to be added to the network layer of the protocol stack of each router in a network. The function of the secret exchange layer is to allow adjacent routers to periodically generate and exchange (and so share) new secrets. The exchanged secrets are made available to the integrity check layer, which uses them to compute and verify the integrity check for every data message transmitted between the adjacent routers.

Figure 6.1 shows the protocol stacks in two adjacent routers p and q. The secret exchange layer has one protocol: the secret exchange protocol. This protocol consists of the two processes pe and qe in routers p and q, respectively. The integrity check layer has two protocols: the weak integrity check protocol and the strong integrity check protocol. The weak version consists of the two processes pw and qw in routers p and q, respectively. This version can detect message modification, but not message replay. The strong version of the integrity check layer consists of the two processes ps and qs in routers p and q, respectively. This version can detect both message modification and message replay.

In this chapter, we present the weak hop integrity protocol, which is the combination of the secret exchange protocol and the weak integrity check protocol. In the next chapter, we present the strong hop integrity protocol, which is the combination of the secret exchange protocol and the strong integrity check protocol.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, we present the secret exchange protocol, and verify its correctness. Then, we present the weak integrity check protocol, and verify its correctness.

1. SECRET EXCHANGE PROTOCOL

In the secret exchange protocol, the two processes pe and qe maintain two shared secrets sp and sq. Secret sp is used by router p to compute the integrity check for each data message sent by p to router q, and it is also used by router q to verify the integrity check for each data message received by q from router p. Similarly, secret sq is used by q to compute the integrity checks for data messages sent to p, and it is used by p to verify the integrity checks for data messages received from q.

As part of maintaining the two secrets sp and sq, processes pe and qe need to change these secrets periodically, say every te hours, for some chosen value te. Process pe is to initiate the change of secret sq, and process qe is to initiate the change of secret sp. Processes pe and qe each has a public key and a private key that they use to encrypt and decrypt the messages.

	Contents	7
	Preface	9
	Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION	12
	Chapter 2 ABSTRACT PROTOCOL NOTATION	18
	1. PROCESSES AND CHANNELS	18
	2. CONSTANTS, VARIABLES, AND ACTIONS	19
	3. STATE TRANSITION DIAGRAM	22
	4. PROCESS ARRAYS, PARAMETERS, AND PARAMETERIZED ACTIONS	25
	Chapter 3 ABSTRACT SECURE PROTOCOLS	28
	1. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ADVERSARY	29
	2. SECURITY KEYS	29
	3. MESSAGE DIGESTS	31
	4. NONCES	31
	5. TIMEOUT ACTIONS	32
	6. AN EXAMPLE PROTOCOL WITH SECURITY FEATURES	32
	Chapter 4 DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS	36
	1. COMMUNICATION-STOPPING ATTACKS	37
	2. RESOURCE-EXHAUSTING ATTACKS	39
	Chapter 5 SECURE ADDRESS RESOLUTION PROTOCOL	42
	1. ARCHITECTURE OF SECURE ADDRESS RESOLUTION	42
	2. THE INVITE-ACCEPT PROTOCOL	46
	3. THE REQUEST-REPLY PROTOCOL	52
	4. EXTENSIONS	58
	4.1 Insecure Address Resolution	59
	4.2 A Backup Server	64
	4.3 System Diagnosis	65
	4.4 Serving Multiple Ethernets	65
	Chapter 6 WEAK HOP INTEGRITY PROTOCOL	66
	1. SECRET EXCHANGE PROTOCOL	67
	2. WEAK INTEGRITY CHECK PROTOCOL	73
	Chapter 7 STRONG HOP INTEGRITY USING SOFT SEQUENCE NUMBERS	78
	1. SOFT SEQUENCE NUMBER PROTOCOL	78
	2. STRONG INTEGRITY CHECK PROTOCOL	81
	Chapter 8 STRONG HOP INTEGRITY USING HARD SEQUENCE NUMBERS	86
	1. HARD SEQUENCE NUMBER PROTOCOL	87
	2. A PROTOCOL WITH SAVE AND FETCH OPERATIONS	89
	3. CONVERGENCE OF NEW HARD SEQUENCE NUMBER PROTOCOL	94
	4. APPLICATION OF SAVE AND FETCH IN STRONG HOP INTEGRITY PROTOCOL	97
	5. TRADEOFFS BETWEEN SOFT SEQUENCE NUMBERS AND HARD SEQUENCE NUMBERS	97
	Chapter 9 IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS	99
	1. KEYS AND SECRETS	99
	2. TIMEOUTS	100
	3. SEQUENCE NUMBERS	100
	4. MESSAGE OVERHEAD	102
	Chapter 10 OTHER USES OF HOP INTEGRITY	104
	1. MOBILE IP	104
	2. SECURE MULTICAST	108
	3. SECURITY OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS	111
	3.1 Security of RIP	112
	3.2 Security of OSPF	113
	3.3 Security of RSVP	115
	4. SECURITY IN AD HOC NETWORKS AND SENSOR NETWORKS	116
	References	118
	Index	122