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Approval Voting Second Edition

:	Steven Brams, Peter C. Fishburn
:	Approval Voting Second Edition
:	Springer-Verlag
:	9780387498966
:	2
:	CHF 80.70
:

:	Mathematik
:	English

:	200
:	Wasserzeichen
:	PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
:	PDF

This book presents a simple and logical potential electoral reform. Under this system, voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate, its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and a probable increase in voter turnout.

	Preface to the First Edition	11
	Footnotes to Preface	13
	List of Tables	16
	List of Figures	17
	Chapter 1 Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution	18
	1.1. The Multicandidate Problem	18
	1.2. A Solution: Approval Voting	20
	1.3. What's Wrong with Approval Voting?	27
	1.4. An Illustration of the Effects of Different Rules: The 1980 New Hampshire Primaries under Approval Voting	28
	1.5. Prospects for Adoption	29
	Footnotes to Chapter 1	30
	Chapter 2 Sincerity and Strategy- Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?	32
	2.1. Introduction	32
	2.2. Voter Preferences and Dominance	33
	2.3. Dominance between Strategies	36
	2.4. Admissible Strategies	39
	2.5. Sincere Voting and Strategy- Proofness	45
	2.6. Conclusions	49
	Footnotes to Chapter 2	50
	Chapter 3 The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?	52
	3.1. Introduction	52
	3.2. Dichotomous Preferences	54
	3.3. Runoff Systems	57
	3.4. Dominance, Admissibility, Sincerity, and Strategy- Proofness of Runoff Systems	59
	3.5. Condorcet Possibility Theorems	64
	3.6. Condorcet Election Guarantees	69
	3.7. Conclusions	71
	Footnotes to Chapter 3	73
	Chapter 4 The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules	76
	4.1. Introduction	76
	4.2. Background on the 1976 House Majority Leader Election	77
	4.3. Best/ Worst Analysis: A Preliminary Appraisal	78
	4.4. Single- Peaked Preferences	80
	4.5. Different Voting Systems	83
	4.6. Conclusions	86
	Footnotes to Chapter 4	88
	Chapter 5 Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?	90
	5.1. Introduction	90
	5.2. Efficacy	91
	5.3. Situation- Specific Effects and Power	95
	5.4. Power and Equity for Dichotomous Voters	98
	5.5. Optimal Voting Strategies	101
	5.6. An Asymmetric Example	105
	5.7. Conclusions	107
	Footnotes to Chapter 5	107
	Chapter 6 Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data	110
	6.1. Introduction	110
	6.2. Deductions from Election Totals	111
	6.3. Results for Three and Four Candidates	112
	6.4. Modified Assumptions and Disaggregated Data	115
	6.5. Analysis of Approval Voting Ballot Data^	116
	6.6. An Empirical Example and Probabilistic Analysis	120
	6.7. Conclusions	123
	Footnotes to Chapter 6	124
	Chapter 7 Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections	125
	7.1. Introduction	125
	7.2. Concerns about Public Opinion Polling	126
	7.3. Plurality Voting	128
	7.4. Approval Voting	131
	7.5. Runoff Systems and an Empirical Example	137
	7.6. Conclusions	139
	Footnotes to Chapter 7	140
	Chapter 8 Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions	142
	8.1. Introduction	142
	8.2. The 1980 New York Senate Race: A Reprise of 1970?	142
	8.3. Approval Voting and Presidential Elections	144
	8.4. The Sensitivity of Voting Systems to Numbers of Candidates	150
	8.5, Approval Voting and Game Theory	153
	8.6. The Monotonicity Paradox	156
	8.7. Conclusions	160
	Footnotes to Chapter 8	161
	Chapter 9 Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election	165
	9.1. Introduction	165
	9.2. Preferences and Voter Behavior	167
	9.3. Analysis of Anderson Supporters ( but Not Voters)	171
	9.4. Inferences from Voter Percentages	177
	9.5. Conclusions	181
	Footnotes to Chapter 9	182
	Chapter 10 Epilogue	184
	Glossary	187
	Bibliography	191
	Index	201