| PREFACE | 6 |
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| THE SAFETY- CRITICAL SYSTEMS CLUB | 8 |
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| Safety-critical Systems Symposium | 8 |
| CONTENTS LIST | 10 |
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| Interdependence of Safety and Security | 13 |
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| Achieving Safety through Security Management | 14 |
| 1 Introduction | 14 |
| 2 General Parallels | 15 |
| 3 SPECIFIC CONTROLS | 20 |
| 4 General Conclusions | 30 |
| Towards a Unified Approach to Safety and Security in Automotive Systems | 32 |
| 1 Introduction | 32 |
| 2. Description of the Two Approaches | 34 |
| 3. Merging the Two Approaches | 39 |
| 4. Conclusion | 43 |
| Dependability-by-Contract | 46 |
| 1 Introduction | 46 |
| 2 Dependability Goals | 47 |
| 3 Dependability Lifecycle | 48 |
| 4 Practical Examples | 58 |
| 5 Conclusions | 60 |
| Demonstrating Safety | 64 |
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| Achieving Integrated Process and Product Safety Arguments | 66 |
| 1 Introduction | 66 |
| 2 Role of Process Evidence in Safety Arguments | 68 |
| 3 An Example Product Argument | 70 |
| 4 An Example Process Argument | 72 |
| 5 Discussion | 76 |
| 6 Summary | 78 |
| The Benefits of Electronic Safety Cases | 80 |
| 1 Introduction | 80 |
| 2 Making the most of scarce resource | 81 |
| 3 Knowing when to stop | 85 |
| 4 Cost- effective exploitation of safety information | 88 |
| 5 Conclusions | 93 |
| 6 Acknowledgements | 93 |
| 7 References | 93 |
| Safety Management | 94 |
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| A Longitudinal Analysis of the Causal Factors in Major Maritime Accidents in the USA and Canada ( 1996- 2006) | 96 |
| 1 Introduction | 96 |
| 2 Method | 98 |
| 3 US National Transportation Safety Board Results | 101 |
| 4 Canadian Transportation Safety Board Results | 105 |
| 5 Conclusions | 111 |
| A Proactive Approach to Enhancing Safety Culture | 116 |
| 1 Introduction | 117 |
| 2 Organisation and Cultural Drivers | 118 |
| 3 Safety Culture and the Nuclear Industry | 118 |
| 4 Safety Culture Enhancement Plan | 120 |
| 5 Nuclear Safety Culture Workshops | 121 |
| Comparing and Contrasting some of the Approaches in UK and USA Safety Assessment Processes. | 128 |
| 1 Introduction | 128 |
| 2 Common Definitions or not? | 129 |
| 3 Comparison of Industry Data | 131 |
| 4 Value of a Prevented Fatality (VPF) | 133 |
| 5 Safety Planning | 135 |
| 6 Safety Reporting | 137 |
| 7 Summary | 139 |
| 8 References | 139 |
| Trends in Safety Case Development | 142 |
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| Safety Case Composition Using Contracts - Refinements based on Feedback from an Industrial Case Study | 144 |
| 1 Introduction | 144 |
| 2 Modular GSN Definition | 145 |
| 3 Issues of Using Modular GSN Notation | 148 |
| 4 Issues of Using Safety Case Contract Tables | 149 |
| 5 lAWG Proposed Implementation of Safety Case Contracts | 151 |
| 6 Summary | 156 |
| 7 Acknowledgements | 157 |
| 8 References | 157 |
| THE SUM OF ITS PARTS | 158 |
| Introduction | 158 |
| The First Cut | 159 |
| Partition by Persistence | 159 |
| 160 | 159 |
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| A Note on Review and Agreement | 162 |
| A Bit More Detail | 163 |
| Conclusion | 168 |
| Lessons in Safety Assessment | 172 |
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| Independently Assessing Legacy Safety Systems | 174 |
| 1 Introduction | 174 |
| 2 Large-scale and Legacy Engineering Projects | 175 |
| 3 The Role of the Independent Assessor | 176 |
| 4 The Benefits of Legacy Systems | 178 |
| 5 Assessment Challenges | 178 |
| 6 Lessons | 187 |
| 7 Conclusions | 188 |
| 8 References | 189 |
| Safety Assessments of Air Traffic Systems | 190 |
| 1 Introduction | 190 |
| 2 Safety Management System Essentials | 191 |
| 3 Safety Requirements | 195 |
| 4 Safety Assurance | 200 |
| 5 The European Interoperability Requirement | 203 |
| 6 Conclusions | 205 |
| CARA: A Human Reliability Assessment Tool for Air Traffic Safety Management - Technical Basis and Preliminary Architecture | 208 |
| 1 Introduction | 208 |
| 2 Background to Human Reliability Assessment | 209 |
| 3 Current Approaches in Use | 215 |
| 4 Summary of Lessons from the Evolution of HRA | 217 |
| 5 ATM HRA Requirements | 217 |
| 6 Preliminary Outline of CARA | 218 |
| 7 Conclusion | 222 |
| References | 223 |
| High Integrity from Specification to Code | 226 |
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| AMBERS: Improving Requirements Specification Through Assertive Models and SCADE/ DOORS Integration | 228 |
| 1 Introduction | 229 |
| 2 AMBERS Methodology | 235 |
| 3 Door Health Monitored and Control System ( DHMCS) - AMBERS Demonstrator Project | 246 |
| 4 Conclusion | 250 |
| 5 References | 252 |
| Formalising C and C++ for Use in High Integrity Systems | 254 |
| 1 Introduction | 254 |
| 2 Developing High Integrity Guidance for C++ | 255 |
| 3 Formalising C - the C ^ Subset | 263 |
| 4 Summary | 270 |
| 5 References | 270 |