: Kerstin Groß
: Equity Ownership and Performance An Empirical Study of German Traded Companies
: Physica-Verlag
: 9783790819342
: 1
: CHF 85.30
:
: Volkswirtschaft
: English
: 373
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF

The empirical studies presented in this book model the endogeneity by applying the simultaneous equations methodology on the relation of ownership and financial performance as well as on different ownership dimensions themselves. Its final model comprises a four equations system containing performance, general ownership concentration, managerial and institutional ownership.

2 Basic Aspects of Ownership Structure and Performance (p. 9-10)

2.1 Introduction

To introduce the subject, the following chapter starts by taking a closer look on the concept and the di.erent aspects of ownership structure. This is implemented by an elaboration on the di.erent measures and their development in literature. The section will make clear that ownership is not summarizable in one single or a few variables, but that it constitutes rather a large spectrum of measures due to its di.erent aspects and dimensions. Therefore, ownership variables can always mirror only a part of the real ownership structure, which makes the variable selection an important issue in the ownership and performance literature.

Next Section 2.3 states some statistics on the ownership structure of di.erent countries and compares them to the characteristics of the German market. This will verify the advantageousness of German corporations as research objects. Finally, the literature also uses varying forms of performance measures. They can be distinguished by the applied data type, market-based, accountingbased and hybrid measures. Each type raises di.erent problems. The measures of .nancial performance and their appropriateness in the ownership literature are discussed in the Section 2.4.

2.2 Ownership Structure and its Measures

The following section introduces the reader to the concept of ownership structure. This is done by an elaboration on the di.erent aspects of ownership structure and the resulting measures. The discussion of the various forms of measures and the way they are mirroring the ownership structure is of further importance for the later variable selection.

After assessing some general issues of ownership information, di.erent forms of ownership measures are explained. They are examined by their classi .cation into non-metric and metric measures. Finally, some concluding remarks summarize the topic.

2.2.1 General Aspects of Ownership Structure and its Measures

Ownership structure is a multidimensional construct which therefore cannot be mirrored by a single variable. Two major dimensions structuring ownership information are ownership concentration and owner type.

The ownership concentration renders quantitative information on ownership, representing a share size or the sum of shares or a concentration index, e.g., Her.ndahl coe.cient. The second dimension, the owner’s identity, is the qualitative information about the type of shareholder. This information is important since di.erent owner types have di.erent incentives, utility functions and means of control.2 Widely researched identities are management insiders, with the subgroups of o.cers and directors, and institutional investors. These also constitute the main focus of this work. Further identities like families, company founders, strategic investors and governmental organizations have also gained importance, but are not considered in the course of the dissertation.

Foreword9
Preface10
Contents12
1 Introduction15
1.1 Motivation15
1.2 Objectives17
1.3 Outline19
2 Basic Aspects of Ownership Structure and Performance23
2.1 Introduction23
2.2 Ownership Structure and its Measures23
2.2.1 General Aspects of Ownership Structure and its Measures24
2.2.2 Non-metric Measures27
2.2.3 Metric Measures31
2.2.4 Summary33
2.3 Ownership Characteristics in Germany and Around the World33
2.4 Forms of Financial Performance Measures37
2.4.1 Introduction37
2.4.2 Market-based Performance Measures37
2.4.3 Accounting-based Performance Measures40
2.4.4 Hybrid Performance Measures42
2.4.5 Summary47
3 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses49
3.1 General Remarks49
3.2 Theoretical Background50
3.3 Ownership Concentration and Performance55
3.3.1 E.ect of Ownership Concentration on Performance55
?,57
3.3.2 E.ect of Performance on Ownership Concentration59
3.3.3 Summary of Hypotheses on Ownership Concentration61
3.4 Insider Ownership and Performance62
3.4.1 E.ect of Insider Ownership on Performance62
3.4.2 E.ect of Performance on Insider Ownership67
3.4.3 Summary of Hypotheses on Insider Ownership69
3.5 Institutional Ownership and Performance70
3.5.1 E.ect of Institutional Ownership on Performance71
3.5.2 E.ect of Performance on Institutional Ownership75
3.5.3 Summary of Hypotheses on Institutional Ownership76
3.6 Ownership Concentration, Insider and Institutional Ownership77
3.6.1 General Discussion77
3.6.2 E.ect of Ownership Concentration on Insider Ownership78
3.6.3 E.ect of Institutional Ownership on Insider Ownership79
3.6.4 Summary of Hypotheses of Ownership Concentration, Institutional Ownership and Insider Ownership80
3.7 Summary of Hypotheses81
4 Model, Methodology and Data83
4.1 Introduction83
4.2 Model Speci.cations83
4.2.1 Linearity and Monotonousness83
4.2.2 Timing of E.ects88
4.2.3 Endogeneity, Simultaneousness and Causation89
4.2.4 Summary92
4.3 Methodology92
4.3.1 General Aspects of Simultaneous Equations Systems92
4.3.2 Estimation of Simultaneous Equations Systems95
4.3.3 E.ect Decomposition after Simultaneous Equations Estimation97
4.4 Sample Selection and Variables Used99
4.4.1 Sample Selection Data Needs and Data Sources99
Sample Restrictions100
4.4.2 Ownership Variables103
4.4.3 Financial Performance Variables105
4.4.4 Further Control Variables107
Firm Size107
Financial Leverage109
Investment Activities111
Liquidity112
Ease of Monitoring113
Risk113
Growth114
Diversi.cation115
Other Control Variables116
Summary of Hypothesized E.ects116
4.4.5 Descriptives Statistics117
5 Empirical Analyses123
5.1 Analysis Procedure123
5.2 General Ownership Concentration125
5.2.1 Endogeneity Tests125
5.2.2 Model Speci.cation127
5.2.3 Results E . ect of Ownership Concentration130
E.ect of Tobin’s Q136
E.ect of Control Variables on Tobin’s Q140
E.ect of Control Variables on Ownership Concentration142
5.2.4 Robustness Checks143
5.2.5 Summary147
5.3 Insider Ownership148
5.3.1 Endogeneity Tests148
5.3.2 Model Speci.cation149
5.3.3 Results E . ect of Endogenous Variables151
E.ect of Control Variables151
5.3.4 Robustness Concerning the Insider De.nition153
5.3.5 Further Robustness Checks160
5.3.6 Summary162
5.4 Institutional Ownership<