: Daniel Schmicking, Shaun Gallagher
: Daniel Schmicking, Shaun Gallagher
: Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
: Springer-Verlag
: 9789048126460
: 1
: CHF 286.90
:
: 20. und 21. Jahrhundert
: English
: 676
: Wasserzeichen/DRM
: PC/MAC/eReader/Tablet
: PDF
This volume explores the essential issues involved in bringing phenomenology together with the cognitive sciences, and provides some examples of research located at the intersection of these disciplines. The topics addressed here cover a lot of ground, including questions about naturalizing phenomenology, the precise methods of phenomenology and how they can be used in the empirical cognitive sciences, specific analyses of perception, attention, emotion, imagination, embodied movement, action and agency, representation and cognition, inters- jectivity, language and metaphor. In addition there are chapters that focus on empirical experiments involving psychophysics, perception, and neuro- and psychopathologies. The idea that phenomenology, understood as a philosophical approach taken by thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others, can offer a positive contribution to the cognitive sciences is a relatively recent idea. Prior to the 1990s, phenomenology was employed in a critique of the first wave of cognitivist and computational approaches to the mind (see Dreyfus 1972). What some consider a second wave in cognitive science, with emphasis on connectionism and neuros- ence, opened up possibilities for phenomenological intervention in a more positive way, resulting in proposals like neurophenomenology (Varela 1996). Thus, bra- imaging technologies can turn to phenomenological insights to guide experimen- tion (see, e. g. , Jack and Roepstorff 2003; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).
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Anchor 25
Anchor 36
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Naturalized Phenomenology11
Husserl’s Anti-naturalism12
Transcendental Philosophy and Philosophical Psychology15
Philosophical Naturalism22
References25
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Phenomenology and Non-reductionist Cognitive Science28
Introspection and Beyond29
Neurophenomenology31
Front-Loading Phenomenology33
Chaminade and Decety (2002)36
Farrer and Frith (2002)37
Farrer et al. (2003)38
Conclusion39
References40
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A Toolbox of Phenomenological Methods42
‘Phenomenology’: One Term – Many Meanings42
Phenomenology – Just ‘a Way of Seeing’?44
Spiegelberg’s Account of Phenomenological Method as a Series of Steps46
Phenomenological Methods as a Toolbox – Complementing Spiegelberg’s Steps51
Naturalization of Phenomenology – a Conciliatory Proposal58
References61
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Towards a Formalism for Expressing Structures of Consciousness63
Towards a Formalism for Philosophical Phenomenology67
An Application to Scientific Studies of Consciousness79
References86
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Consciousness89
The Natural Attitude89
The Pull of Objectivity92
Consciousness as Empirical and as Transcendental94
The Intentional Core of Experience95
Intentionality, Body, and World97
Conclusion101
References101
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Attention in Context102
A Gestalt-Phenomenology of Attention103
The Context Problem in Attention Research104
Connecting Context to Focus106
Achieving the Bigger Picture in Cognitive Science of Attention: Attention-in-Context-with-Margin110
Dynamic Attention: Context Transformations, Theme Replacements, Attentional Capture112
Context Transformations112
Theme Replacements114
Attentional Capture116
Conclusion117
References119
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The Phenomenology and Neurobiology of Moods and Emotions125
Introduction125
Damasio and Solomon on Emotion125
Heidegger on Moods and Emotions129
The Phenomenology of Feeling131
Horizons and Bodily Dispositions137
Conclusion140
References141
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Phenomenology, Imagination and Interdisciplinary Research143
Introduction: Staking Out the Field143
Imagination in Phenomenology144
Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research148
Conclusion155
References155
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The Function of Weak Phantasy in Perception and Thinking161
Weak Phantasmata in Perception163
Phantasmatic, Non-linguistic Modes of Thinking in Humans and Animals170
References178
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Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness181
A Certain Unity181
Four Irreducible Bodily Dimensions182
The Body-As-Object187
The Body-As-Subject188
Being a Bodily Subject Out of One’s Body191
(De)constructing One’s Bodily-Self194
Conclusion197
References198
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A Husserlian, Neurophenomenologic Approach to Embodiment201
A Description of Lived Experience201
One’s Own Body203
Multi-sensorial Integration Through the Act206
Transforming the Subjective into the Objective208
The Hand Touching and Touched210
Summary213
References214
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Body and Movement: Basic Dynamic Principles217
Introduction217
Embodiment219
Kinesthesia and Fundamental Human Concepts221
Coordination Dynamics: Learning One’s Body and Learning to Move Oneself225
Evolutionary Biology and the Existential Fit of Leib and Körper227
References231
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Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied Cognition235
Empirical Studies of Embodied Cognition and the Spectres of Crypto-Cartesianism236
Mind Is Body: Movement, Time and the Prejudice of Presence242
Body Is Mind: Bringing the Zombie to Leib247
Conclusion248
References249
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The Problem of Other Minds254
Introduction254
The Reality of the Problem of Other Minds255
Conservative Responses to the Problem256
Reductive Responses to the Problem260
Phenomenological Responses to the Problem261
Concluding Remarks266
References266
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Mutual Gaze and Intersubjectivity1268
Mindsight268
Double Sight273
Concluding Remarks279
References280
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Knowing Other People’s Mental States as if They Were One’s Own282
First-Person Perspective283
The Limits of Empathy286
Reconstructive and Mirror Empathy287
Condition of Isomorphism288
Condition of Immediacy290
The Limits of Motor Resonance292
Condition of Isomorphism293
Condition of Immediacy294
Conclusion296
References296
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Intersubjectivity, Cognition, and Language299
Conditions for Description of Mental or Internal States301
The Inte