| Title Page | 2 |
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| Preface | 5 |
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| Organization | 8 |
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| Table of Contents | 10 |
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| On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values | 12 |
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| Introduction | 12 |
| Preliminaries | 14 |
| Incentive Compatibility Characterization | 15 |
| SpecialCases | 16 |
| Revenue-Optimal Static Auctions | 16 |
| Disjoint Intervals | 17 |
| Working with a Specific Problem Instance | 17 |
| MIP Formulation | 18 |
| Instantiation | 22 |
| Experimental Results | 23 |
| Empirical Results | 24 |
| Discussion and Future Work | 25 |
| References | 26 |
| Sequential Auctions in Uncertain Information Settings | 27 |
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| Introduction | 27 |
| The Auction Setting | 28 |
| Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{1}$ | 29 |
| Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{2}$ | 33 |
| Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{3}$ | 34 |
| Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{4}$ | 36 |
| Related Work | 38 |
| Conclusions and Future Work | 39 |
| References | 39 |
| Adapting Price Predictions in TAC SCM | 41 |
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| Introduction | 41 |
| Learning and Adaptation in Agent-Based Markets | 41 |
| The TAC Supply Chain Management Scenario | 42 |
| TacTex-06 and the Computer Price Prediction Problem | 44 |
| Agent Overview | 44 |
| Offer Acceptance Predictor | 44 |
| Learning Price Change Predictions | 46 |
| The 2006 TAC SCM Competition | 47 |
| Agent Implementations | 47 |
| Learning Algorithms | 48 |
| Comparing Results for Different Groups of Agents | 49 |
| Results of the 2006 Final Round | 50 |
| Additional Experiments | 51 |
| Additional Learning Approaches | 52 |
| Related Work | 54 |
| Conclusions and Future Work | 55 |
| References | 55 |
| Exploiting Hierarchical Goals in Bilateral Automated Negotiation: Empirical Study | 57 |
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| Introduction and Motivation | 57 |
| Agents with Hierarchical Goals | 58 |
| The Negotiation Framework | 61 |
| Bargaining: Protocol and Strategy | 61 |
| Reframing: Protocol and Strategy | 64 |
| Agents Behavioural Model | 65 |
| Simulation and Example | 66 |
| Parameters of Experimentation | 66 |
| Detailed Example | 67 |
| Experimental Results | 69 |
| Frequency and Quality of the Deals | 70 |
| Negotiation Complexity | 70 |
| Conclusion and Future Work | 71 |
| References | 72 |
| Theoretically Founded Optimization of Auctioneer’s Revenues in Expanding Auctions | 73 |
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| Introduction | 73 |
| Informed Decision Strategy for Expanding Auctions | 75 |
| Bounded Error of the Informed Decision Strategy | 76 |
| The Optimal Raising Point | 79 |
| Comparison with the VCG Mechanism | 82 |
| The Optimal Increment | 83 |
| Conclusion | 85 |
| References | 86 |
| Designing Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions for Risk Averse Agents: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation | 87 |
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| Introduction | 87 |
| Modeling Utility Functions Under Risk | 89 |
| The Importance of Risk Adversity in Decision Making: An Example | 90 |
| Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Complementarities | 91 |
| Optimal Bidding Policy for Sequential 2nd Price (Vickrey) Auctions | 93 |
| Optimal Bidding Policy for Sequential 1st Price Auctions. Numerical Solutions | 94 |
| Heuristic Addressing Multiple Copies | 95 |
| Experimental Analysis | 96 |
| Experimental Analysis of Distribution of Risk Profiles ofWinning Bidders | 97 |
| Experimental Analysis of Market Efficiency and Auctioneer Revenue | 97 |
| Conclusions and Further Work | 99 |
| References | 100 |
| Traffic Management Based on Negotiations between Vehicles – A Feasibility Demonstration Using Agents | 101 |
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| Introduction | 101 |
| Related Work | 102 |
| Definitions | 103 |
| Desirable Properties | 104 |
| Agent-Based Traffic Control | 105 |
| Mechanisms | 106 |
| Time-Slot Request | 106 |
| Time-Slot Exchange | 107 |
| Evaluation | 110 |
| Experimental Setup | 110 |
| Alternatives Evaluated | 111 |
| Results | 113 |
| Conclusions | 114 |
| References | 115 |
| On Choosing an Efficient Service Selection Mechanism in Dynamic Environments | 116 |
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| Introduction | 116 |
| Learning to Choose Among Service Selection Mechanisms | 117 |
| Environment Characteristics | 118 |
| Reinforcement Learning | 118 |
| Discretization of Continuous State Space | 120 |
| Service Selection Mechanisms | 123 |
| ating-BasedMechanisms | 123 |
| Experience-Based Mechanisms | 123 |
| Performance Comparisons of Service Selection Mechanisms | 124 |
| Experimental Evaluation | 125 |
| Discussion | 128 |
| References | 129 |
| Adaptive Sniping for Volatile and Stable Continuous Double Auction Markets | 130 |
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| Introduction | 130 |
| AgentModelofCDAs | 132 |
| Related Work | 133 |
| Small Increment Agent | 134 |
| Kaplan Traders in Volatile and Stable Markets | 135 |
| Adaptive Sniper Strategy | 137 |
| Adaptive Sniper Results | 141 |
| Conclusion | 143 |
| References | 144 |
| On the Empirical Evaluation of Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions | 146 |
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| Introduction | 146 |
| Combinatorial Auctions | 148 |
| Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions | 149 |
| Bid Generator Requirements | 150 |
| A Taxonomy of Transformations | 150 |
| Requirements | 151 |
| An Algorithm for Artificial Data Set Generation | 153 |
| Good Generation | 154 |
| Requested Goods Generation | 154 |
| Market Transformations Generation | 154 |
| Bid Generation | 156 |
| Experimental Results | 158 |
| Conclusions and Future Work | 160 |
| References | 160 |
| Analysing Buyers’ and Sellers’ Strategic Interactions in Ma
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