: John Collins et al. (Eds.)
: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis AAMAS 2007 Workshop, AMEC 2007, Honolulu, Hawaii, May 14, 2007, and AAAI 2007 Workshop, TADA 2007, Vancouver, Canada, July 23, 2007, Selected and Revised Papers
: Springer-Verlag
: 9783540887133
: 1
: CHF 44.70
:
: Internet
: English
: 251
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: PDF

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce, AMEC IX, co-located with the Sixth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2007, held in Honolulu, Hawai, in May 2007, and the 5th Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis, TADA 2007, co-located with the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2007, held in Vancouver, Canada, in July 2007. 

This volume presents 15 carefully revised and selected papers from these workshops. The primary and complementary goal of both workshops was to continue to bring together novel work from diverse fields on modeling, implementation and evaluation of computational trading institutions and/or agent strategies. The papers originating from AMEC focus on a large variety of issues on auctions, negotiation, and strategic behavior in electronic marketplaces. The papers originating from TADA reflect the effort of the community to design scenarios where trading agent designers and market designers can be pitched against one another.

Title Page2
Preface5
Organization8
Table of Contents10
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values12
Introduction12
Preliminaries14
Incentive Compatibility Characterization15
SpecialCases16
Revenue-Optimal Static Auctions16
Disjoint Intervals17
Working with a Specific Problem Instance17
MIP Formulation18
Instantiation22
Experimental Results23
Empirical Results24
Discussion and Future Work25
References26
Sequential Auctions in Uncertain Information Settings27
Introduction27
The Auction Setting28
Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{1}$29
Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{2}$33
Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{3}$34
Equilibrium Bids for Scenario $S_{4}$36
Related Work38
Conclusions and Future Work39
References39
Adapting Price Predictions in TAC SCM41
Introduction41
Learning and Adaptation in Agent-Based Markets41
The TAC Supply Chain Management Scenario42
TacTex-06 and the Computer Price Prediction Problem44
Agent Overview44
Offer Acceptance Predictor44
Learning Price Change Predictions46
The 2006 TAC SCM Competition47
Agent Implementations47
Learning Algorithms48
Comparing Results for Different Groups of Agents49
Results of the 2006 Final Round50
Additional Experiments51
Additional Learning Approaches52
Related Work54
Conclusions and Future Work55
References55
Exploiting Hierarchical Goals in Bilateral Automated Negotiation: Empirical Study57
Introduction and Motivation57
Agents with Hierarchical Goals58
The Negotiation Framework61
Bargaining: Protocol and Strategy61
Reframing: Protocol and Strategy64
Agents Behavioural Model65
Simulation and Example66
Parameters of Experimentation66
Detailed Example67
Experimental Results69
Frequency and Quality of the Deals70
Negotiation Complexity70
Conclusion and Future Work71
References72
Theoretically Founded Optimization of Auctioneer’s Revenues in Expanding Auctions73
Introduction73
Informed Decision Strategy for Expanding Auctions75
Bounded Error of the Informed Decision Strategy76
The Optimal Raising Point79
Comparison with the VCG Mechanism82
The Optimal Increment83
Conclusion85
References86
Designing Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions for Risk Averse Agents: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation87
Introduction87
Modeling Utility Functions Under Risk89
The Importance of Risk Adversity in Decision Making: An Example90
Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Complementarities91
Optimal Bidding Policy for Sequential 2nd Price (Vickrey) Auctions93
Optimal Bidding Policy for Sequential 1st Price Auctions. Numerical Solutions94
Heuristic Addressing Multiple Copies95
Experimental Analysis96
Experimental Analysis of Distribution of Risk Profiles ofWinning Bidders97
Experimental Analysis of Market Efficiency and Auctioneer Revenue97
Conclusions and Further Work99
References100
Traffic Management Based on Negotiations between Vehicles – A Feasibility Demonstration Using Agents101
Introduction101
Related Work102
Definitions103
Desirable Properties104
Agent-Based Traffic Control105
Mechanisms106
Time-Slot Request106
Time-Slot Exchange107
Evaluation110
Experimental Setup110
Alternatives Evaluated111
Results113
Conclusions114
References115
On Choosing an Efficient Service Selection Mechanism in Dynamic Environments116
Introduction116
Learning to Choose Among Service Selection Mechanisms117
Environment Characteristics118
Reinforcement Learning118
Discretization of Continuous State Space120
Service Selection Mechanisms123
ating-BasedMechanisms123
Experience-Based Mechanisms123
Performance Comparisons of Service Selection Mechanisms124
Experimental Evaluation125
Discussion128
References129
Adaptive Sniping for Volatile and Stable Continuous Double Auction Markets130
Introduction130
AgentModelofCDAs132
Related Work133
Small Increment Agent134
Kaplan Traders in Volatile and Stable Markets135
Adaptive Sniper Strategy137
Adaptive Sniper Results141
Conclusion143
References144
On the Empirical Evaluation of Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions146
Introduction146
Combinatorial Auctions148
Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions149
Bid Generator Requirements150
A Taxonomy of Transformations150
Requirements151
An Algorithm for Artificial Data Set Generation153
Good Generation154
Requested Goods Generation154
Market Transformations Generation154
Bid Generation156
Experimental Results158
Conclusions and Future Work160
References160
Analysing Buyers’ and Sellers’ Strategic Interactions in Ma