| Contents | 8 |
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| Introduction | 12 |
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| Chapter One Knowledge, Ability, and Manifestation | 82 |
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| Part One: Knowledge As Ability | 82 |
| Knowledge and Knowing: Ability and Manifestation | 84 |
| Wie Wissen funktioniert | 112 |
| Part Two : Knowledge Through Ability | 138 |
| Knowing Full Well | 140 |
| Die Natur von Fähigkeiten und der Zweck von Wissen | 152 |
| The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology | 170 |
| Knowledge, Abilities, and Epistemic Luck: What Is Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and What Can It Do? | 190 |
| Knowledge as a Fallible Capacity | 226 |
| Part Three: Knowing-How | 254 |
| Knowing-How: Indispensable but Inscrutable | 256 |
| Knowledge-How, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle’s Return | 280 |
| Chapter Two Knowledge in Situations: Contexts and Contrasts | 316 |
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| Part One: Contextualism | 316 |
| Two Varieties of Knowledge | 318 |
| Nonindexical Contextualism – an Explication and Defense | 340 |
| Part Two : Contrastivism | 362 |
| What is Contrastivism? | 364 |
| Contrastive Knowledge | 368 |
| Contrastivism rather than Something Else? – On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism | 406 |
| Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann | 422 |
| PS: Response to Schaffer’s Reply | 436 |
| Chapter Three Challenging Justification - The Nature and Structure of Justification | 444 |
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| Verantwortlichkeit und Verlässlichkeit | 446 |
| Justification, Deontology, and Voluntary Control | 472 |
| Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem | 498 |
| Das einfache Argument | 520 |
| What Is Transmission Failure? | 538 |
| Chapter Four Varieties and Forms ofKnowledge: Animal, Phenomenal, and Practical Knowledge | 544 |
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| Epistemology and Cognitive Ethology | 546 |
| Non-Human Knowledge and Non-Human Agency | 568 |
| Phänomenales Wissen und der Hintergrund | 600 |
| Rechtliches Wissen | 628 |
| Chapter Five Skepticism: Pragmatic Answers ? | 638 |
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| Wittgensteins Zweifel | 640 |
| Skepticism, Contextualism and Entitlement | 660 |
| Wittgenstein and Williamson on Knowing and Believing | 682 |
| Notes on Contributors | 702 |
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